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Abstract
This article uses the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in G.( J.) v. New Brunswick to frame a discussion of
the historical and ideological character of Canadian child welfare regimes on the nature and experience of
women’s citizenship within the liberal political order and, in particular, within the current neo-liberal
restructuring of welfare provision. The article also analyzes traditional understandings of the political
character of child welfare in terms of state intervention and non-intervention, by placing the state ordering of
parent-child relations in the context of larger issues of colonialism, gendered parenting discourses, and the
linkage between child neglect and poverty. The article argues that this more complex account of state/family
relations exposes the rhetorical slippage between a family privacy and family support interpretation of liberal
respect for family autonomy in both judicial discourse and the broader political sphere.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Child welfare law is commonly depicted as a classic struggle
between the state and the family that must be resolved by placing children
at the centre in accordance with the "best interests of the child" principle.
Despite women's continuing role as the primary caregivers, the case law
concerning children's welfare rarely acknowledges any of the complex social
and economic inequalities that structure how children's interests are
addressed. Women are cast typically as the threat to children's welfare, as
inadequate providers, nurturers or protectors. The particularities of the
lives of children's mostly female caregivers are subsumed by the urgency
that attends so many situations of child neglect and by the assumption that
a naturalized notion of mothering is the key to children's well-being.
Critical scholars have tried to expose and analyse the ideology of child
welfare law's subtext on motherhood. They have attempted to return
Child Wfelfare Law and State Restructuring
women to the narrative about the nature of child welfare law in a manner
that demands A more complicated analysis of law's role in sustaining
economic, social, and cultural inequalities and in reinscribing a regime of
colonial dominance with respect to Aboriginal peoples.1
In a recent decision, New Bniswick (Minister of Health and
Community Serices) v. G.J. [. G.], 2 the Supreme Court of Canada returns
women to the narrative via a different route, namely by requiring that
judges must take account of parental Charter rights under section 7? In
addition, the Court found that section 7 principles of fundamental justice
sometimes require the provision of publicly funded legal aid to parents
faced with the apprehension of their children under child welfare statutes.
Although the majority used the gender neutral term "parent" to set out
these constitutional principles, material presented by the intervenors and
relied upon by Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in her concurrence demonstrated
the overwhelming predominance of mothers as the key respondents in the
majority of child welfare cases As Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 put it, "[t]his
case raises issues of gender equality because women, and especially single
mothers, are disproportionately and particularly affected by child
protection proceedings. ' Thus, G.(J.) brings together the themes of the
nature of child welfare law, its role in shaping the terms of women's
membership in the liberal political order, and the strategic, discursive, and
I See, in particular, M. Kline, "Complicating the Ideolegyof Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and
First Nations Women" (1993) 18 Queens L. 306 [hereinafter "Complicating the Idcoloa,']; M. Wine,
"Child Welfare Law, 'Best Interests of the Child' Ideology and First Nattns" (1992) 30 Osq dc Hall
LJ. 375 [hereinafter "Child Welfare Law"]; P. Monture, "A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and First
Nations" (1989) 3 CJ.W.L 1; J. Mosoff, "'A Jun, Dressed in Medical White and Judicial Black':
Mothers with Mental Health Histories in Child Welfare and Custody" in S. Boyd, cd.. Ckalckar.the
Publc/Fri rate Divide: Feminismn Lai,, and Public Plicy (Toronto: Uni%.erity of Toronto Pre5:, 1937)
227 [hereinafter Challengingthe PubliclPrivate];K. Sv.ift,"An Outrage to Common Deccnc,' Hrioncal
Persipectives on Child Neglect," (1995) 74 Child Welfare 71; and K. S,,;i ft, Manufacturum '1g131 . i:tas'r
A Critical Perspecthe on Child Neglect (Toronto: Uniersity of Toronto PreKs. 1995).
2 [1999],3 S.C.R. 46 [hereinafter G.(J.)] Chief Justice Lamer, as he then va5, vrote the majority
opinion, which was agreed to by Justices Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Major and Binnie. Concurng
reasons were written by Justice L'Heureux-DubC and agreed to by Justices Gonthier and McLachhn.
3 In G.(J.), the Supreme Court of Canada consolidated its preiouwIy fragmentcd pasition on the
extent to which section 7 extends to protect aspects of the parent-child relationship, This agreement on
the nature of the parental rights dimension of secunty of the le.rson %, as subsequently confirmcd in
imnnipeg Child and Fandy Senmice v. KL.W, [2000] 2 SC.R. 519, a case. that dealt with a Ectton 7
parental rights challenge to warrantles apprehensions in non-emergency situations,
4 See also, G.fJ.) v. Aeis' Brun ick (Factum of the Womens Legal Education and Action Fund
at para. 19).
5 G.(J.), supra note 2 at 99-100, per Justice L'Heurcui-Dubi.
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political character of the Charter of Rights and, in particular, of section 7
rights.
The figure of the plaintiff and the story of her legal struggle is
inspiring. A single mother on income assistance whose three children had
been taken into state custody for six months, she persevered through
numerous levels of the New Brunswick court system before achieving her
first victory at the Supreme Court of Canada. Invoking section 7's promise
of liberal respect for individual liberty and security of the person, she staked
out her claim in an area-parent-child relations-which, in Blackstone's
memorable words, had traditionally been the "empire of the father."6 Her
victory in the Supreme Court of Canada has direct and progressive
consequences for herself and for the numerous others-mostly women,
disproportionately members of racialized groups, many disabled, and
almost all of them poor-who find themselves in her situation.7 A closer
reading, however, tarnishes somewhat this optimistic assessment. The
majority decision is not only unrelentingly narrow and qualified in its
willingness to accord G.(J.) the recognition and material support demanded
by her Charter arguments, but also constructs her entitlement in the
political language of individual sovereignty and self reliance so recently
reinvigorated by the turn to neo-liberalism in the broader political sphere.
In this article, I examine the evolution of child welfare law in order
to understand the political repercussions contained in the G. (J) decision
and their implications for women within the Canadian political order. -I will
posit in very general terms three orthodox conceptions of the liberal
political community-classical liberalism, social democracy or welfare
liberalism, 8 and neo-liberalism. 9 These three conceptions are associated
6 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Englandvol. 1, 17th ed., (London: Richard Taylor,
1830) at 453.
M.J. Mossman, "New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J):
Constitutional Requirements for Legal Representation in Child Protection Matters" (2000) 12 C.J.
W.L 490.
8 In a comparative context, the post-war Canadian welfare state, like that in the United States and
Great Britain, is characterized as "market liberal" to distinguish it from the social democratic regimes
characteristic of the Scandinavian countries and the conservative-corporatist regimes characteristic of
some continental European countries such as France, Germany and Italy. See G. Esping-Anderson, The
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). However, as my
comparison focuses on different historical models in the Canadian context, I will use the term "social
democratic" to denote the change in political ideals and concepts of the entitlements of citizenship that
characterized Canadian social welfare efforts in the post-war era. Note that the Esping-Anderson
scheme has been criticized as a model that presumes a male worker-citizen by focusing on the extent
to which the state acts positively to ameliorate market-derived inequalities and by overlooking the
(VOL. 39, NO. 4
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with three historical periods: the post-Confederation period to the 1940s;
the 1940s to the early 1970s; and the period from the early 1970s to the
present. The character of these historical periods is, of course, much more
ideologically complex and ambivalent, and the transition from one to the
next never clearly marked by total transformations in administrative, legal,
and ideological features. In particular, the period from 18SO to 1940 say-
significant institutional and legal developments that were at odds with the
continuing dominance of classical liberal ideology and that laid the
foundation for the reforms during the mid-century period.10 My focus,
however, is on dominant understandings With a view to delineating the
return, in the present period, to earlier, residual ideals vAthout any
significant alteration of the welfarist rhetoric of institutional models of
welfare provision. My argument is that this discontinuity between form and
substance is reflected in a slippage that occurs in the second and third
periods between conceptions of child welfare and their underlying material
and structural requirements. Drawing on the experience in British
Columbia and Ontario, I vrill endeavour to show how a social-democratic
rhetoric of family support gradually took on the neo-liberal flavour of
family privacy as pressure to fundamentally redesign the Canadian political
order in the neo-liberal mold consolidated and moved to the centre of
popular expectations and political discourse.
It should be noted here that child welfare in Canada, with the
exception of Aboriginal child welfare, comes within the jurisdiction of the
provincial level of government." Thus, a thorough study would have to
relation of the state to familial inequalities. P.M. E%ans & GR, Wckerle, "Shiftin, the Terrain of
Women's Welfare: Theory, Discourse, and Activism" in P. E~ans and G-R.N ekerle, eds., smcn and
the Welfare Canadian State: Challenges and Change (Toronto: Unr'.ersit of Toronto Press, 1947) 3 at
10 [hereinafter Women and Wefare and "Shifting Terrain"].
91 am borrox, ng from the framework used in J. Bahan et at., "Developments in Censtituttional
Law: The 1993-94 Term," (1995) S.C.LR. (2d) 67.
10 For an analysis of the emergence of notions of enlarged public rcFlansiblity for soal velfare
during the period from 1S0-1940 in Canada, see D. Chunn, From PanThmcnr to Dow3 G:.: Famil'
Courts and Socialized Justice in Ontario, 1830.I1 940 (Toronto: UmerFsit of Toronto Pres, 1 2)
11Child welfare falls under the residual jurisdiction assigned to the pro"incial level grocrnmcnt
by section 92(13) "Property and CMI RighW'of the Co'nsmation Act, 1F-7 (U.K.) 39 & 31 Vict., .3,
reprinted in R.S.C. 19S5, App. II, No.5. Aboriginal child wlfare falls under the "Indian and Lands
Reserved to Indians" jurisdiction assigned to the federal lewel of gowernment under section 91(24) of
the ConsritutionAct 1867, ibid. In 1951, the federal go eminent took steps to begin a process of phaxg
out its own residential school approach to Aboriginal child vxelfare and to hae provincial chld ,elfarc
regimes apply to Aboriginal children. A. Armitage, "Family and Child Welfare in First Nations
Communities" [hereinafter"Fir:t Nations Commumties'l in B. Wharf, ed., Rctn'!u Chzdd 11fJTrem
Canada (Oxford: Oxford Univertity Press. 1993) 131 at 144-51 jhereinafterPlm'shintng CLetf Wcfare]
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track the historical development of eleven different regimes. As my inquiry
focuses on the general nature of child welfare and on commonalities in how
child welfare is conceived and configured within the political order, I have
treated the British Columbia and Ontario experience as roughly
representative of the history of child welfare in English Canada. I have also
used references to the parallel history of a discrete regime under federal
jurisdiction with respect to Aboriginal child welfare as a means of
demonstrating problematic assumptions about the nature of child welfare.
Two themes run through my study. The first concerns the persistent
framing of the central theoretical issue in child welfare law in terms of the
tension between state intervention and non-intervention. 2 Child welfare
law's political character is shaped by the degree to which the state
intervenes in family relationships. This notion is reinforced by the orthodox
view that child welfare laws have remained firmly residual in approach
throughout Canadian history.' 3 The residual model of welfare defines the
sphere of state engagement in welfare provision in negative terms and
accords the primary role in addressing need and providing for the material
support and welfare of individuals to the family and other institutions of the
private sphere, most notably the market. To this extent the residual model
reflects classical liberal values of individualism, self-reliance, and negative
liberty. The first child welfare statutes in Canada were imbued with these
values. However, the statutes also introduced the harsh remedy of child
removal based on a finding of parental neglect. t4 The apparent
inconsistency between such a drastic invasion of the sphere of parental
authority and the anti-statist individualism of classical liberalism, supported
the characterization of these early residual regimes and their successors as
"interventionist." Subsequent reforms are assessed in terms of the extent
they resort to the remedy of child removal into state custody.15 Thus, the
12 R. Barnhorst, "Child Protection Legislation: Recent Canadian Reform" in B. Landau, ed.,
Children's Rights in the Practice of Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 255. See also, M. Hall, "A Ministry
for Children: Abandoning the Interventionist Debate in British Columbia" (1998) 12 Int. J. of L Pol.
& Fam. 121.
13 A. Armitage, "The Policy and Legislative Context" in Rethinking Child Welfare, supra note 11,
37 at 44 [hereinafter "Policy and Legislative Context"). Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux arc
usually credited with developing the residual/institutional terminology. See H.L. Wilensky & C.N.
Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Free Press, 1965) at 1138-40.
14 See discussion infra note 39.
15 See "The Policy and Legislative Context," supra note 13 at 44; and Barnhorst, supra note 12 at
255-58. Brian Wharf points out that the residual format that triggers state intervention only at the point
of crisis, namely when children are seriously at risk, "ensures that such intervention will be intrusive."
[VOL. 39, NO. 4
Child Welfare Law and State Restructuing
intervention/non-intervention schematic seems to provide an appropriate
lens for gauging the political character of regimes that remain rooted in this
familiar classical vision of public and private spheres.
However, the interventionlnon-intervention schematic, to the extent
that it sets in motion unexamined assumptions about the material and
structural context of social relations, can be misleading. As Frances Olsen
puts it, "[s]tate intervention is an ideological, not an analytic concept."r 6
The schematic presumes state intervention is an inherently negative
intrusion into a previously sealed off and impermeable space of liberating
private relations, that a decision to withdraw regulatory oversight is not in
itself an allocation of power, and that the constitutional and political order
is organized exclusively through deliberated upon decisions, backed by
repressive force, to allocate, transfer, and withdraw authority. More fluid
and complex accounts of power, in particular its ideological and constitutive
dimension, are left out of this simplified portrait of the nature of state
intervention. Writing in the same vein as Olsen, Martha Minow argues that
a rigidly dichotomized state intervention framework "neglects both the
variety of meanings state intervention has in practice, and the ubiquity of
state involvement in family relations." 7 Throughout this article, I will trace
the ways in which an oversimplified state intervention schematic in the
context of child welfare has often erased experiences that contradict its
narrative about the relationship of the political order to human liberation,
and, in particular, to the liberation of women who, like G.J., demand fully
realized lives for themselves and their children in the face of complex and
intersecting factors of disadvantage.
The second theme concerns the privatization agenda that has
become the defining feature of neo-liberal strategies aimed at dismantling
the Keynesian programs put in place during the social democratic period.
Privatization redraws the public/private boundary with respect to
responsibility for need. It contemplates a retreat from collective
responsibility for the material and social well-being and dignity of all
citizens and the endorsement, instead, of notions of private and individual
See also, B. N, harf, "Organizing and Delivering Child Welfare Seimces The Contnbutions of
Research" in J.Hudson & B. Galaway, eds,, Child I1;lfare in Canada: Recearch and IP!e k&,r'y at~s
(Toronto: Thompson Publishing, 1995) at 5.
16 F. Olsen, "The Myth of State Intervention in the Family" (1935) 13 U Mich J.L Ref V35 at
at 863.
17 hl. Minow, "Beyond State Intern ention in the Famfly For Baby Jane Doe" (1935) 13 U ,MIch.
J. L Ref. 933 at 1010.
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responsibility. Privatization, however, can also refer simply to the reliance
by the state through contract on private institutions-either non-profit or
commercial-to deliver programs aimed at carrying out the public social
welfare mandate. Child welfare law has always been privatized in both
senses of the word.' 8
First, child welfare law has been premised, since its inception, on
the notion that families-institutions that function ideologically and
structurally as the most quintessentially private of all institutions-should
bear the responsibilities and costs of child rearing. Thus, the history of child
welfare law is really about different modes of implementing and justifying
that fundamental alignment between the state and the family. Child welfare
regimes also stand in special relation to the second meaning of
privatization, namely privatization understood as a mode of implementing
a public responsibility without necessarily reconfiguring public/private
relations in the more fundamental sense. Some argue that privatization in
this sense addresses need in a more pluralized, democratic and localized
fashion. 9 Historically, child welfare regimes in Canada have relied heavily
on private institutions to deliver benefits and services and thus have always
been privatized, to a large extent, in this second sense. Children's aid
societies, for example, began as private voluntary organizations that then
were delegated a child protection mandate under legislation.2" In many
18 The two meanings of privatization often get used interchangeably because in recent years the
strategy of privatization in the sense of contracting out service delivery to private-sector organizations
has been used to facilitate privatization in the more fundamental sense of reducing public responsibility
for need. See J. Ismael & Y. Vaillancourt, eds., Privatization and Provincial Social Services in Canada:
Policy, Administration and Service Delivery (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1988) [hereinafter
Privatization] for a series of essays that discuss the extent of privatization- in both senses of the word-
in a number of Canadian provinces. See also, Patricia Evans's and Gerda Wekerle's description of
"reprivatization" in Women and Welfare, supra note 8 at 7.
19 D. Donnison, "The Progressive Potential of Privatisation" in J. LeGrand & R. Robinson, cds.,
Privatisation and the Welfare State (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984) 45. For an overview of
arguments in favour of privatization, see J. LeGrand & R. Robinson, "Privatisation and the Welfare
State: An Introduction" in LeGrand & Robinson, eds., ibid., I at 7-14. For a contrary view that argues
that privatization modes of delivering public programs are the first step in off-loading responsibility for
need to the private sector, see generally L. Hurl, "Privatized Social Service Systems: Lessons from
Ontario Children's Services" (1984) Can. Pub. Pol. 395-405; Privatization, ibid.; J. Pulkingham & G.
Ternowetsky, "The Changing Context of Child and Family Policies" in Pulkingham & Ternowetsky,
eds., Child and Family Policies (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997) 14 [hereinafter "The Changing
Context"]; and M. Kline, "Blue Meanies in Alberta: Tory Tactics and the Privatization of Child
Welfare" in Challenging the PubliclPrivate, supra note 1 at 330.
E. McIntyre, "The Historical Context of Child Welfare in Canada" in Rethinking Child Welfare,
supra note 11 at 22-32 describing the early role of privately constituted children's aid societies in Nova
Scotia, British Columbia and Ontario. See generally, D.C. Bracken & P. Hudson, "Manitoba;" and R
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proNinces, the societies or other kinds of private institutions still play that
public role while retaining their private status. As pressure to privatize
public programs grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle the
two senses of privatization. Governments today frequently pursue
privatization in both the substantive and methodological senses."'
This article wll discuss privatization in the first and substantive
sense, namely in terms of the political understanding of responsibility for
material and social well-being. It is therefore important to examine not only
the Idnd, range, and funding of services provided in a privatized manner,
but also the underlying philosophy of need and of responsibility for need.
The focus will be on how the two rhetorics of state intervention and of
privatization meet and become entangled in today's political discourse.
Simply put, state intervention is usually understood as a trespass upon the
classical liberal values of individual freedom and family privacy.
Privatization, the shift of responsibility from the state to individuals,
families, and the market, makes normative sense in relation to the "neo"
version of liberal values currently dominating political agendas. However,
state intervention in the child welfare context, as I hope to show in this
essay, has been subject to several contradictory meanings. The malleable
liberal language of respect for the integrity and autonomy of the family, in
an earlier era, was more resonant with social democratic values. It signaled
support rather than the right to be left alone. Recently, however, liberal
values of respect for family have provided the rhetorical justification for a
family privacy rather than family support approach to the issue of
responsibility for child rearing. A glance back at the history of child welfare
regimes reveals the tension and overlay of these two different
meanings-family support and family privacy-of state intervention in
families.
II. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF CHILD WELFARE
A. The Starting Point: The ResidualApproach to Child Welfare
(1880-1940)
The first child welfare statutes enacted at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth centuries breached previous boundaries on
Mishra, G. Laws & P. Harding, -Ontario" in Piratikation, supra note IS [hereinafter "Ontano].
21 See generally, Pri vatization., ibid.
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parental and family privacy. The statutes enacted during this period laid the
foundation for the liberal welfare state by "sanction[ing] unprecedented
intervention into deviant or potentially deviant families."2 The first Ontario
child protection statutes did so by extending a remedy of removal of
children from families in which neglectful parenting imperiled children's
well-being, thereby explicitly asserting a state interest in the lives of children
in a comparatively broad range of families. Previously, state programs
dealing with children's welfare were confined to children in orphanages,
almshouses, workhouses and poor houses, and to criminal children, and
were directed primarily at securing children's labour in the market.2 Rather
than turning to institutional care, the early child protection regimes
introduced a reliance on individualized familial solutions in the form of
foster care to deal with children in state custody.24 Nevertheless, these
reforms, despite the ground-breaking nature of some of their features,
operated within the ideological and structural constraints of classical
liberalism that remained dominant and unchallenged during this period
2 2 Chunn, supra note 10 at 44. Chunn's analysis includes the federal Juvenile DelinquentsAct, 1908,
S.C., 1908, c. 40, with the Ontario child protection statutes as another important example of the shift
at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries in conceptions of the state's role in relation
to the ordering of family life and of children, in particular. A more comprehensive portrait than is
possible in this article of changing conceptions of children's welfare would include a more detailed
account of the shifting and often blurred line between criminal and child welfare law.
P. Rooke & R.L Schnell, Discarding the Asylum: From Child Rescue to the Welfare State in
English Canada 1800-1950 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983) at 68; N. Sutherland, Children
in English Canadian Society: Framing the Twentieth Century Consensus (Toronto: University of Toronto,
1976) at 91; E. McIntyre, supra note 20 at 16; K. Swift, "Contradictions in Child Welfare: Neglect and
Responsibility" in C. Baines, P. Evans, & S. Neysmith, eds., Women's Caring: Feminist Perspectives on
Social Welfare, 2w" ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998) 160 at 234-71 [hereinafter Feminist
Perspectives and "Contradictions."]
24 A. Jones & L Rutman, In the Children's Aid: J.J. Kelso and Child Welfare in Ontario (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1981) at 36; C.T. Baines, "Restructuring Services for Children: Lessons
from the Past" in S. Neysmith, ed., Restructuring Caring Labour (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
2000) 164-84 [hereinafter "Restructuring Services"). Baines, in a study of the impacts of the
professionalization of social work at the beginning of the twentieth century, notes that the
accompanying shift to reliance on foster care and social worker intervention in child placement had
negative consequences for working class mothers. In particular, it prevented them from negotiating, and
thereby exercising more control over the placement of their children in residential facilities. Such
facilities, Baines points out, were resorted to frequently during times of economic stress and functioned
often in the same way as private boarding schools for more economically privileged families. Ibid. at 169.
[VOL. 39, No. 4
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within political discourse." In particular, these regimes left intact
assumptions about the privatized nature of familial relations.
These early child protection regimes were steeped in Blackstonian
notions of parental responsibility for children and thus were not about
recognition of public responsibility for child welfare but, more precisely,
about "enforcing needed care through the medium of the family."
However, these statutes were far from neutral. Rather, the regimes
deployed a range of strategies, both coercive and non-coercive, to enforce
not only private responsibility for familial need, but also a specific and
idealized notion of the nature and structure of family.z7 The key features of
this familial ideal-a conception of childhood as a stage of dependency, of
motherhood in terms of primary responsibility for nurture and unpaid
caring labour, and of fatherhood in terms of moral authority and financial
supportwas at odds with the organization of the majority of Canadian
families at the time, in both rural and urban worldng class settings?'
Chunn,supra note 10 at 28. Chunn'sbook rebuts the view that reform efforts during the p.eriod
from 1880 to 1940 failed to produce significant change. Instead, she argues that instituttonal, legal and
social practiceswith respect to social welfarein Canada underventaqualitati-e. transformatioa betvcen
ISSO and 1940 that ultimately made possible the development of publicly funded universal Ez-ial
programs in the mid-century period. Mid at 8. Hovwever, she points out that "public repudiation of
laissez-faire principles did not begin to coalesce in Canada until the 1940s."1W., at 28. Thus, reforms
to institution., modes of delivery and social work practices that occurred in this early pzriod, although
ultimately transformative rather than merely supplemental, took place within the constraints of the
laissez-faire state. As Chunn puts it: "the prevailing ideologyof individualism and the minimal state and
the underdevelopment of the social sciences set limits on the publicly acceptable re-Tanzes to Eocial
problems at this time. Thus, the idea that the state should act directly to normalize and maintain
marginal families in the community was, for most people, inconceivable, particularly in the contest of
a predominantly rural society such as Canada's." Ibid. at 41.
26
"Contradictions," supra note 23 at 238. E. McTnt)Te makes the same obzeivation about child
welfare regimes during this period, namely that "...the state, it should be noted, fcused its intervention
more on the controlling and enforcing of standards of care and on aspects of parenthood that included
'limiting and directing their emironments, opportunities and actiitis,' rather than on the caring
aspects, leaving responsibility for financial maintenance and discipline with the child's o;wn parents."
Supra note 20 at 21, quotingM. Reitsma-Street,A Fernzist4na 4sisofOntaria La sforDdinqz.en yand
Neglect: More Control than Care (University of Toronto, Faculty of Social Work, Working Papers on
Social Welfare in Canada, 1986) at 9. Finally, Chunn points out that "hat was different about the nev
welfare statutes...was the esplicit provision of state pow er to enforce the priatization of the costs of
social reproduction." Supra note 10 at 49.
2 7 E. Zaretsky, "Rethinking the Welfare State: Dependence, Economic Individualism and the
Family" in J. Dickinson & B. Russell, eds., Fami. Economy and State: The SecialReproa~ction o:=ess
Under Capitalvsm (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1986) 85, 95; and J. Ursel, Pdvate Lii -c, PUtbrPo!4 7c-
100years of State Intervention, (Toronto: Women's Press, 1992) at 61-124 [hereinafter Pirate Lites.
28 Zaretshl ibidl
29 Chunn, supra note 10 at 39-40.
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Typically, within these non-middle class and rural families, both children
and mothers had roles as workers outside the domestic unpaid sphere,"
children's leisure time was often unsupervised, 31 schooling for children was
sporadic and tied to economic pressure,32 and, in some instances, extended
family networks, whether for cultural or economic reasons, pooled
resources to form one household. 3 The nuclear family ideal was fully
realized only in the minority of families at the time, namely middle- class
families living in urban settings. 4
In the new child welfare regimes, the deeply privatized notion of
children's welfare, as well as its linkage to the traditional nuclear family,
manifested itself in two key assumptions: first, that state action is only
triggered at the point that families seriously fail to perform their "natural"
child rearing function, and second, that original and foster families should
do parenting work with virtually no public support. 3 The day-to-day aspects
of caring labour were performed, in both types of families, largely by
mothers who were often expected to engage in paid work to assist their
economically struggling families and cope with child rearing as well as the
illnesses and disabilities that accompanied rapid industrialization and
urbanization. In addition, the early regimes assumed that charitable and
religious organizations would continue to provide the bulk of services for
distressed families." Even funding of the administrative infrastructure
3 0 PrivateLivexsupra note 27 at 85-98. With respect to children as workers, see J. Bullen,"Hidden
Workers: Child Labour and the Family Economy in Late Century Urban Ontario" in B. Bradbury, ed.,
Canadian Family History: Selected Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1992) 199; B. Bradbury,
"Gender at Work at Home: Family Decisions, the Labour Market, and Girls' Contributions to the
Family Economy" in Bradbury, ibid. at 177-98 [hereinafter "Gender at Work"]; and C. Gaffield,
"Schooling, the Economy and Rural Society in Nineteenth Century Ontario" in J. Parr, ed., Childhood
and Family in Canadian History (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1982) 69.
31 S. Houston, "The 'Waifs and Strays' of a Late Victorian City: Juvenile Delinquents in Toronto"
in Parr, iba at 129.
32 Gaffield, supra note 30. See also, Sutherland, supra note 23 at 156-71.
3 3 J. Parr, "Introduction" in Parr, supra note 30 at 13-14 [hereinafter "Introduction"J.
34 Chunn, supra note 10 at 39-40; "Introduction," ibid.
3 5 Jones & Rutman, supra note 24 at 82. The underfunded and largely voluntary nature of foster
care work remains true today. In 1981, Nicholas Bala and Kenneth Clarke wrote: "Foster parents
receive a minimal sum for each foster child they have, generally from $5 to $10 a day, an amount that
barely covers the cost of feeding the child. Clearly, this is the least expensive form of care that can be
provided, as foster parents are virtually in a volunteer status, taking children out of a sense of love." N.
Bala & K. Clark, The Child and the Law (Toronto: McGraw Hill-Ryerson, 1981) at 121-22. See also,
Martyn Kendrick, Nobody's Children: The Foster Care Crisis in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1990).
36 Jones & Rutman, supra note 24 at 71-76.
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underpinning the statutes remained largely by donation and by a haphazard
network of municipal grants well into the second half of the twentieth
century3'
Typically, these first statutes enumerated categories of disorderly
and morally suspect behaviour that were combined with vague undefined
terms such as serious peril, neglect, impropriety, and lack of parental
control." In this way, a large, unstructured discretion was conferred on
social workers and, in turn, the judges who decided whether to order
committal to state care. Furthermore, these statutes were at least as
concerned with the quasi-criminal business of child protection, child
delinquency, and the trial and punishment of the offence of parental
neglect as with children's welfare?9
The early statutes and their successors are typically referred to as
harshly interventionist because of the broad unstructured powers they
conferred on state officials and because, once triggered, their impacts on
families were severe-fines, imprisonment, and removal of children! This
sort of intervention presumes a state that is monolithically and inherently
negative in character and sets in motion a measuring tool aimed at the
exercise of repressive force for determining the character of state ordering
of parent-child relations. Yet intervention can also be viewed as positive
and facilitative if the intervention is in the form of support services to assist
families in staying together, rather than in the punitive form of removing
children from their homes. More generally, if one considers intervention
from the standpoint of collective responsibility for basic material well-
being, then the early statutes were drastically non-interventionist. Rather
than providing basic assistance, the early statutes adhered to a regime
directed primarily at moral and social correction despite the distressing
spectacle of families devastated by rapid social and economic change. Thus,
a more complex meaning of "intervention" emerges if competing notions
of state ordering are contemplated.
37 N. Troeme, "Child Welfare Services" in R. Barnhorst & LJohnson, eds., The State ofthe Child
in Ontario (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991) 63 at 64.
3S See, for eample, An Act for the Prevention of Cnuthv to. and Better Potcrtion of Children, S.O.
1893, r. 45, ss. 3, 14 [hereinafter Preention of CrncftvAct; and Chldren's Protection Act of Briish
Columbia, S.B.C. 1901, c. 9, s 4,5 [hereinafter Chlzdren'sProtcaionActl,
39 For example, the first portion of the Prevention of CnteAct defines the offence of parental
neglect, its trial by summary conviction, and its punishment vath a fine or imprirtnent. I&. at 39, Qa.
2--S. The final portion concerns trials of children who commit offences.IL, ,- 24-30,
40
"Policy and Legislative Context," spra note 13 at 46-49; and Barnhorst, npra note 12
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Conversely, if direct repression is the measure of state intervention,
one can argue that from the perspective of federal Aboriginal child welfare
regimes during the same period, the repressive aspects of these early
statutes were minimal and their "facilitative" aspects were striking
compared to federal Aboriginal child welfare regimes during the same
period. A deliberate policy of wholesale removal and institutionalization of
Aboriginal children in residential schools was developed by the federal
government, beginning in the 1880s and extending into the 1960s, with the
consequential destruction not only of Aboriginal families but of entire
communities.41 Emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, spiritual and moral
devaluation, destruction of sibling and familial ties, eradication of linguistic
and cultural heritage, and substandard education characterized the
experience of many of the Aboriginal children who found themselves in the
residential school program. The combination of these factors led all too
often to the economic, social, and cultural disintegration of Aboriginal
communities and intergenerational patterns of familial breakdown. 2
The formal differentiation between federal regimes directed at
Aboriginal children and provincial regimes of general application during
this early period presents a particularly stark and graphic picture of the
racial and colonial agenda underlying child welfare's focus on the
supervision of parent-child relations as "the key to the vigor of the
citizenry."43 Aboriginal peoples have historically posed a fundamental
challenge to the legitimacy of non-Aboriginal assertions of political and
territorial sovereignty in both colonial and neo-colonial Canada, rendering
Aboriginal childhood a primary site for struggles over colonial domination
41 A. McGillivray, "Therapies of Freedom: The Colonization of Aboriginal Childhood" in A.
McGillivray, ed., Governing Childhood (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) 135 at 152-58; and
"First Nations Communities," supra note II at 134-43.
42 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, v. I (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply
& Services, 1996) at 333-37.
43 G. Mink, "The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Origins of the American Welfare
State" in L Gordon, ed., Women and the Welfare State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990)
92 at 93. Mink argues that motherhood, in particular, is the focal point of the American welfare state's
inculcation of the norms of citizenship. A number of Canadian scholars have examined the racial
subtext of motherhood discourses in contemporary Canadian child welfare cases concerning Aboriginal
mothers. See "Complicating the Ideology," supra note 1; and Monture, stpra note 1. The experience
of the residential school program for Aboriginal children and its explicit objective of removing
Aboriginal children from "the uncivilized state in which [they have] been brought up" reinforces the
linkage between the discourses of motherhood and citizenship that characterize contemporary debates
about child welfare. McGillivray, supra note 41 at 155, quoting the 1889 Indian Affairs Annual Report
in J.R. Miller, ed., Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian- White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1991) 196.
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and self-governance.44 However, the racial and nationalist complexion of
child welfare is also evident during this period in mainstream regimes and
programs concerning children, many of which explicitly or implicitly
differentiated between children and families of the "right kinds.. .i.e. Anglo-
Celtic and worthy citizens of the True North," and others.4 Aboriginal
children, racialized children, children of immigrants, delinquent children
from destitute and vorldng class families, and children with mental or
physical disabilities found themselves consigned to institutions or
programmes that applied the harsher methods of segregation and
punishment to mold them for what was often a secondary or subordinate
form of citizenship.
In summary, the first child welfare statutes purported to re-draw the
line between state and family, and to herald an era in which the state
appeared more willing to compromise parental/paternal authority and
autonomy. However, the co-existence of the new child saving agenda
introduced by these early statutes with the residential school approach for
children whose racial, cultural, or class position set them outside the social
norm, undermined the objectivity and clarity of distinctions based on the
newly introduced legalized concept of neglect. As a consequence, the public
order/familial privacy orthodoxy that stands behind the state
intervention/non-intervention rubric becomes less useful, if not misleading,
as a normative guide to mapping the character of child welfare regimes
during this first period of their history. The second period of velfare
history, during which a different conception of social welfare took hold in
the political mainstream-albeit briefly and never in fully realized
form-reinforces this point, namely the importance of complicating the
intervention/non-intervention schematic.
44 McGillivray, ibid at 136-3S.
45 R.L Schnell, "Childhood Rescued and Retained in English Canada" in P. Roake & R.L.
Schnell, eds., Studies in ChildhwodHistow (Calgary: Detselhg Enterprises, 1932) 204 at 269 [hereinafter
Childhood History], referring to the nature of the propaganda promoting the country life mo' ement in
Alberta in the early part of the 20th century. Nova Scotia had explicitly race differentiated "paars'
asylums" during the same period. See P.T. Rooke & R.L Schnell, "GutterniFes and Charity Children:
Nineteenth Century Child Rescue in the Atlantic Provinces" in CIddlchr Htstoy. b:d. 82 at S5. The
authors note in this context that racial segregation was instituted at a time when Eexual separation was
considered unnecessary for pauper children in state institutions because they twere seen to lack the
sensitivities of middle-class children. Ibid.
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B. Institutional Models of Child Welfare and the Second Historical
Period (1940-1970s)
The social democratic vision of the political order adheres to the
liberal blueprint of the relationship between state and society. However,
within this modified and more modem context, the unencumbered abstract
individual of classical liberalism becomes the embodied individual of the
Keynesian welfare state with concrete material needs and diverse cultural
commitments. In other words, a societal shift occurred towards a welfare
state in which greater attention was given to the provision of basic material
needs for society at large, rather than to the earlier primitive form of
intervention aimed at distinct groups. The embodiedness of the individual
invites both particularization and concretization of needs, thus shifting the
boundary between public and private and justifying the revision of the
state's role in terms of facilitating, reinforcing, and supporting social
equality through social spending and regulation.
The institutional model of social welfare associated with the
historical shift to a more social democratic vision of the political order is
built on the notion of social citizenship, namely the notion that members of
the liberal political community should be guaranteed basic economic and
social security rights in addition to civil and political rights.4" In Canada, the
foundation for the liberal welfare state was laid by the reforms of the period
between 1880-1940. However, the attempt at implementation of social
democratic ideals took place in the mid-twentieth century decades, roughly
from the 1940s to the early 1970s. The experience of the Depression in the
1930s followed by a world war is often credited with instilling in the political
culture a widespread sense of collective responsibility for risk and need.4
Thus, rather than viewing state- funded benefits as residual and need as
indicative of individual moral failure, post-World War II initiatives often
viewed benefits in terms of rights and basic entitlements. Universality and
comprehensiveness were key features of post-war programs such as family
allowance, old age security, and health care, distinguishing them from the
46 T.H. Marshall, "The Right to Welfare" in T.H. Marshall, ed., The Right to Welfare and Other
Essays (New York: Free Press, 1981) 83.
47 P. Armstrong, "The Welfare State as History" in R. Blake, P. Bryden, & F. Strain, eds., The
Welfare State in Canada: Past, Present and Future, (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Publishing, 1997) 52 at 54
[hereinafter Welfare State]; J.C. Turner, "The Historical Base" in J.C. Turner & F.J. Turner, eds.,
Canadian Social Welfare, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Allyn & Bacon, 1995) 75 at 80-82; D. Guest, The
Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 3rd ed. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997)
83 at 133.
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minimalist and morally pejorative approach typical of the residual model
of welfare provision.4s
The relative prosperity of the post-war era facilitated the
development of these more generous and affirmative institutional style
welfare programs, culminating in 1966 with the Canada Assistance Plan
(cAP), a federal provincial agreement that both expanded and structured
federal transfer payments to the provinces in order to strengthen the social
citizenship rights of Canadians. Importantly, CAP not only provided
resources, but also did so on conditions that at least partially strove for the
social citizenship ideals of universality, comprehensiveness, and respect for
individual dignity.49 While the social democratic ideal was never fully
realized in Canada, a significant, if imperfectly realized, shift in the general
understanding of the relation between the state and society, and of liberal
citizenship occurred during this period.
Feminists have been quick to point out that the newly embodied
liberal citizen of the post-war era is often presumed to be a white male
heterosexual worker and that the renegotiated public/private split is shaped
typically by racial and sexual ideologies.P In the context of social velfare,
feminist critical scholars have focused on the extent to which social welfare
programs not only fail to challenge the structural dimension of economic
inequalities but also reflect, overlook, or further entrench social inequalities
based on gender, race, sexual orientation, and ability vithin families and
workplaces51 A key feminist insight is that many of the institutional style
programs of this era, most notably the family allowance, reproduced a
gendered social order, replacing one form of patriarchy with another.'
Nevertheless, the direction of much feminist critique has been to demand
fuller, more substantive realization of social democratic ideals for Canadian
women and more attention to the social control and depoliticizing aspects
of a heavily bureaucratized welfare state, rather than to reject the
fundamental notion that social risks and responsibilities should be shared
equitably and fundamental needs securely met w, ithout undermining
individual dignity.53
43 Guest, ib
49 Ibi at 145-47; and Armstrong, supra note 47 at 60
50 See generally, Private Lives, supra note 27; and 11men and Welfare, supra note 8.
Women and Welfare, ibid
52 Private Lives, supra note 27 at 54-57.
.
3 Armstrong, supra note 47 at 61; and "Shifting Terrain,' supra note 3 at 3-27.
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Marilyn Callahan offers an example of how the social democratic
conception of the state might be deployed by feminists in the context of
child welfare. She argues that a feminist rethinking of child welfare would
see the removal of the "quasi-crime of neglect" from child welfare statutes
and its replacement with the primary and exclusive mandate to support
caring work and provide caring services. She elaborates as follows:
If chronic neglect is primarily a matter of poverty, frequently the poverty of disadvantaged
women, then it should be dealt with as a resource issue rather than a personal, individual
problem. If situational neglect occurs, such as the abandonment of children, then such
problems can be dealt with by providing care and resources to children, locating parents, and
helping them make plans for their children. Proving them unfit to care for their children in
either case is irrelevant, as it wastes court time and damages parent-child relationships."
To the extent that better material supports and services for
parenting are the benchmark of the institutional approach, this model has
the potential to address the division of labour within families and to give it
more visibility as a public issue. Unfortunately, social democratic values
affected the design of child welfare regimes in Canada only indirectly and
in an extremely fragmentary way. Mid-century reform period took for
granted many of the operational and ideological features of their
predecessors. My argument, however, is that despite their limited impact
on child welfare regimes, the shifts in the political, legal, and economic
climate provided a glimpse of an alternative to the residual model. The
following sections trace these partial impacts on child welfare regimes in
Ontario and British Columbia. I have divided the reforms into two
categories. The first covers a range of different changes which,
cumulatively, indicated greater political recognition of the importance of
thinking of children as members of the liberal "public" with distinct public
welfare needs. The second category focuses on a significant change in social
work philosophy which, in the political and economic climate of the mid-
century period, spurred the development of child welfare regimes that
aspired to provide families with psychological, educational, and, most
importantly, some measure of material support.
54 M. Callahan, "Feminist Approaches: Women Recreate Child Welfare" in Rethinking Child
Welfare supra note 11, 172 at 204-05.
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C. Enhancement of the "Public" and "Welfare" Dinensions
The first wave of reforms consisted of administrative and
organizational changes which, when taken together, emphasized the need
for public accountability and fairness in dealing with issues relating to
children's well-being. Although the changes did not contemplate any radical
rethinking of the meaning of child welfare, they did give it a more public
character and, at least on a formal level, introduced a more explicit and
expanded focus on welfare rather than one limited to protection. For
example, in Ontario, the Child Welfare Act5 of 1954 introduced references
to the interests and welfare of children not only in its title but in provisions
setting out the role and powers of the courts ' Commentators have noted
more generally that the 1960s was the era when the welfarist "best
interests" principle began to appear as the legislative test for procedural
issues The "best interests" principle subsequently assumed a more central
role as an overarching principle, thus making it clear that children, like
other members of the community, should be the subjects of publicwelfare
in ways that take account of their distinctiveness. The public character of
the new regimes was enhanced also by a movement to professionalize the
workforce," a rationalization of the regulation of parent-child relations by
55 S.O. 1954, c. S.
56 Ibid s& 16(14), (17) concerning the termination of permanent wardship and the extension of
wardship beyond age eighteen.
57 Walter c: aL, "'Best Interests' in Child Welfare Proceedings: Implications and
Alternatives" (1995) 12CJ.F.L. 367 at 372. Note, hoy ever, that in B.C. the"best interests" test did not
appear until 196S, and then was introduced only as a dispositional test for prmanent orders of
committal. Protection of Chdren Act R.S.B.C. 1960, e. 303. s. 10(4), as am. by S.B.C. 196, c. 41,s 5
[hereinafter Protecton of Children Act 196S]. In child welfare, the "best interests" principle heralded
a move away from a presumption in favour of birth family ties when determining custody. By
constructing children as individuals, set apart from their birth families and with distinctive needs for
emotional and psychological securit34judicial interpretations of the "best interests" principle facilitated
the placement of children in adoptive and foster families, Hoever, the individualized focus of the
principle also facilitated judicial avoidance of the structural and systemic factors that dtisdvantae the
birth parentswho are often young, female, economically%-ulnerable, single and, frequently, Abzriginal.
See, for e.ample, "Child Welfare Law," supra note I.
5S C.T. Baines, " Women's Professions and an Ethic of Care" in Fcn znist Pe,-taii es, ucra note
23 at 23, chronicles the professionalization of social vork in Canada during the early and middle 2,31h
century and waysin which professionalization entrenched a se\-stratified v. orkforce and work ethic. Se
also, "Restructuring Services," supra note 24.
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consolidating a variety of statutes into one regime,5 9 and more attention to
the structure and reporting obligations of children's aid societies.'
Although the more self-consciously public and welfarist
understanding of the character of child welfare was manifested in the
changes to the formal face of the law, the new statutes retained the key
elements of a residual regime. In particular, they still provide for
apprehension and committal of children to state care based on moralistic
and imprecise notions of child neglect6' with the concomittant conferral of
a relatively unstructured discretion on judges and social workers
notwithstanding-or perhaps because of-vague references to the interests
and welfare of the child.62
D. The "Least DetrimentalAlternative"Approach and the Proliferation
of Support Services
The second type of reform that took hold in the 1960s and 1970s
was motivated by disillusionment with the paternalism and ineffectiveness
of state-funded substitute care for children in need of protection. The
growing stature of the "best interests" test meant that social workers and
judges had a broader basis on which to take action. The main response,
however, remained the same as under the old-style residual statutes, namely
removal-albeit with clearer controls on its type and length. As
disillusionment with the remedy of removal and state care grew, the aim of
reform became, wherever possible, to support and supervise children at risk
without removing them from their families. In other words, change was
predominantly driven, not by any shift in the conception of state/family
relations, but by exasperation with the methods of maintaining those
relations. The phrases "permanency planning"63 and "the least detrimental
59 See, for example, Child WelfareActsupra note 57; Protection of Children Act, R.S.B.C 1948, c.
48; and the Adoption Ac, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 7.
60 Trocme, supra note 37 at 65; and Child Weflare Act, S.O. 1965 c. 14 s. 8.
61 See the definition of a neglected child in the Child WelfareAct, R.S.O. 1960, ch. 53, s. 11(1)(c)
and the enumeration of classes of children in need of protection in the Protection of Children Act,
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 303, s. 7.
62 "Child Welfare Law," supra note 1.
63 The permanency planning movement highlighted the detrimental impacts of foster care "drift"
and multiple placements for children at risk. Troeme, supra note 37 at 65. Advocates of permanency
planning advocates argue that children should be maintained in their own homes if possible, and that
out-of-home care is unstable and undesirable. See A. Maluccio et at, "Beyond Permanency Planning"
(1980) 56 Child Welfare 515; A. Maluccio & E. Fein, "Permanency Planning: A Redefinition" (1983)
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alternative"' were coined to indicate this revised approach to dealing With
children at risk and its philosophy of maintaining those children, if possible,
within their families.
The turn to the "least detrimental alternative" approach had, at
least on the surface, very little to do with giving child welfare more of a
public character, and, indeed, it was often described and promoted in terms
that invoked classical liberal notions of respect for family privacy and family
integrity.' Nevertheless, despite the rhetoric of family privacy and the
limited nature of the social democratic reforms during this period, child
welfare laws were experienced in significantly different ways. Two factors
account for the change in the character of children's welfare. First, the shift
to the "least detrimental alternative approach" resulted in a steep drop in
the number of children in care. Second, increased funding made it possible
to enhance children's protection and well-being by materially supporting
their families 6
The increased availability of resources under CAP resulted in the
devotion of larger amounts of stable government funding for child welfare
and for related programs directed at families. For example, in Ontario
during the 1960s, funding of child welfare at the provincial level went from
a collection of small grants to supplement municipal and charitable funding
57 Child Welfare 195; R. Chisholm, "Permanency Planning and Child Placement Law and PolicF. A
Slogan and its Limitations" (19S7) 18 J. Comp. Fain. Stud. 207; and S. PalmerfaintainonwFam4,Th-s-
Incush'e Practice in Foster Care (Washington: Child Welfare League of America, 1995) at 2. But ize P.
Steinhauer, The LeastDetimentalAlternativrezA Systenmatic Guide to CasePlanmni andDcctwn Ma!dng
for Children in Care (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 220-21. Steinhauer is critical of
permanency planning to the extent that in its rejection of unplanned long term and badly managed
foster care placement% it overlooks the fact that r-ell.planned long-term foster care is "the least
detrimental alternative" for many children. Ibid. at 220-32.
64 The "least detrimental alternative available standard"was articulated byJ. Goldstein, A. Freud
& A. Solnit in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (New Yo rk: Free Press, 1973) at 53-64 (hereinafter
Beyond the Best]. This standard stressed children's psychological need for continuity in relationships
and for respect for their own rather than adults' sense of time. In addition, the standard was guided by
a conviction concerning -law's incapacity to supervisu interpcr-onal relationships and the Imits of
knowledge to make long-range predictions." Ibid. at 49.
65 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit linked their articulation of the "least detrimental alternative"
standard to a preference fora non-interventionist approach to child welfare, the value of familyprivacy;
and a presumption of parental autonomy. In doing so, they itnoked the classical tension betveen family
integrity and state intrusion. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Soltin, Before the Best Interests of the ChIU
(New York: Free Press, 1979) at 4-14 [hereinafter Before the Best).
66 Trocme, supra note 37 at 67-71.
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to 80 per cent of the operating budgets of children's aid societiesi6 In
addition, many of the expanded resources were directed at an
unprecedented variety of support services for families and children. cAP
stipulated the direction of approximately a third of federal transfer
payments toward welfare services aimed at alleviating the causes and effects
of poverty. 68 With the help of this conditional funding, services such as
"income support, medical services, recreational groups, child care,
educational resources, housing, homemakers, and institutional settings for
disturbed children" proliferated.69 The result was that the steep drop in the
number of children in care was accompanied by an equally sharp rise in the
number of families served by child welfare authorities." Thus, there was a
material basis upon which to address children's welfare by supporting them
within and through their families rather than by removing them. The
expansion of services in this manner coincided with larger shifts, from an
emphasis on moral correction of the poor to one on socialization and
normalization of non-conforming families, and from a decentralized focus
on children's well-being to a focus on children as part of a set of
interdependent familial relationships.71
The change in social work philosophy toward the "least detrimental
alternative" principle envisioned serving children at risk, where feasible,
through family support services. The change occurred well in advance of
any formal amendments to the surface of the governing statutes. The NDP
government in British Columbia in the early 1970s began but never finished
a process of comprehensive amendment and change which, among other
things, contemplated statutory entitlements to support programs, a legal
67Ibd. at 64. The Child WelfareAct, S.O. 1965, c. 14, s. 12 commits the provincial government to
funding 100 per cent of the costs related to the care of children of unmarried mothers and 40 per cent
of all other services. The remaining sixty per cent is left to municipalities.
"The Changing Context," supra note 19 at 33.
69 "Contradictions," supra note 23 at 244, writing about Ontario as well as generally. See also,
M. Callahan & C. McNiven, "British Columbia" in Privatization, supra note 18, 13 at 16 [hereinafter
"British Columbia]; and "Ontario," supra note 20 at 122.
70
"Ontario," ibid at 119-39, summarize the increase in public welfare expenditures during the
post-War era in Ontario, noting in particular the impact of CAP on the growth of social services. Trocmc,
supra note 37 at 67-68, provides charts that set out the drop in the number of children in care and the
parallel rise in the number of families served by child welfare authorities. This trend continued well into
the eighties.
71 Again, these shifts began in the previous period, in particular during the interwar years.
However, they coalesced during the mid-century period. Chunn, supra note 10 at 19-20. Se also, J.
Donzelot, The Policing of Families (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979) at 58-81 with regards to the
moralization/normalization distinction.
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obligation on child protection workers to offer preventive services to avoid
protection proceedings, and recognition of children's and family rights.7
However, the return to a Social Credit government in 1975 changed the
course of the reform process, resulting in a statute, the Family and Child
Service Act, that featured the welfarist language of "best interests" more
prominently but contained none of the family support and preventive
measures of the earlier drafts73 Indeed, the new definition of "child in need
of protection," although free finally of references to vagrancy and moral
vice, incorporated relatively high standards of endangerment and necessity
into the key doctrinal tests for apprehension and removal It was not until
1984 in Ontario and 1994 in British Columbia that explicit references to
some form of the "least detrimental alternative" principle as well as clear
commitments to family integrity and the continuity of parent-child
relationships appeared on the face of their respective child welfare
statutes.75
In Ontario, the work of voluntary and non-profit private
organizations was not displaced by the expansion of welfare services
directed at families. Rather, these bodies also proliferated, becoming the
vehicles for delivery of new services such as daycare, home support, and
prevention programs.76 Commercial entities also became involved in service
72 Ibid at 37-38.
73 S.B.C. 1980, c. 11. The actual language refers to "safety and well-being." Section 2 of the Act
states- "In the administration and interpretation of this Act, the safety and well.being of a child sall
be the paramount considerations."
74 Ibd.,s. 1.
75 Chd Famil;, and CommunityServiceAc4 S.B.C. 1994, c.27, s. 30(l)(b), as am. byChdd, Fami4,.
and CommunitySeviceAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46, stipulates that removal of a child by a directorwithout
a court order may occur only if there is "no other less disruptive measure," vhile s. 2(b) acerts the
guiding principle that family is the preferred environment for child rearing. Section 4(1)(c) defines the
best interests of the child in terms of continuity in care and maintenance of the parent-child
relationship. In Ontario, interim legislation enacted in 1978 emphasized continuity in care and the
enjoyment of parent-child relationships as a dimension of the best interests of the child. Cild Ticfare
Aci S.O. 1978, c. 85, ss. l(b)(ii), , (v) [hereinafter Child l;'fareAct, 19781. In 1984, Ontario put in
place a regime that articulated the legislative purposes of "giv[ingl support to the autonomy and
integrity of the family" and of recognizing"that the least restrictive or dis ruptm e course of action that
is aiailable and is appropriate in a particular case to help a child or family should be follo.vd." Child
and Famit, SevicesAct, S.O. 1984 ch. 55, ss. l(b),(c) [hereinafter cited to R S.O. 1990, c. 11].
76 
"Ontario, " supra note 20 at 119-22, describe the strong grass roots papulist sntiment that
favoured decentralization and debureaucratization in the administration of soclal services in order to
masimize democracy and citizen participation. The authors point out hey, easily the progressve anti-
statism of actiists on the left merged with and %vas rsertaken by the neo-conserauve do;,nsizing
objectives of the Ontario government in the mid-seventies.
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delivery. However, their role was kept to a minimum, in part because the
terms of CAP favoured reliance on the non-profit sector.77 In addition,
private sector organizations during this period operated under conditional
grants rather than fee-for-service contracts. The former allows
organizations to continue their work as advocates and innovators alongside
their roles as service providers.78 So while the expansion of the privatized
model of service delivery in Ontario during the 1960s and early 1970s may
have laid the groundwork for privatization in the more substantive sense in
later years, initially the aim was better and more services rather than fewer
services.
Similarly, in British Columbia in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
there was an expansion of funding for personal social services. The NDP
government elected in 1972 "substantially increased its subsidy to the
voluntary sector for a wide range of preventive, advocacy, and planning
functions as well as direct client services."79 The increases in funding
continued in the first years of the succeeding Social Credit government.
Again as in Ontario, a privatized model for delivery of the new and
expanded services was favoured. Indeed, the NDP put in place an explicitly
decentralized framework for allocating social welfare resources that
reflected the community based populist values of British Columbia activists
on the left at that time.8°
In summary, the development of an extensive, albeit ad hoc and
often fragmented, array of benefits aimed at support of child caring work
during this post-war period introduced a tension between social democratic
and classical liberal understandings of welfare. The institutional ideal,
rooted in social democratic values, views need-here marked by child
neglect-as a systemic rather than individual parenting failure, an outcome
of poverty, illness, or other phenomena beyond the control of individual
parents. The failure to rethink the nature of state/family relations in any
comprehensive way during this period meant that this ideal was never
realized. Nevertheless, the impact of the residual model was softened by the
77 Ibid. at 129. The authors write that the for-profit sector has been "involved mainly in the
provision of children's residences and daycare centres." Ibid at 128. They also observe that, well into
the eighties, it has been mostly municipalities and children's aid societies using government funds
rather than the Ontario government directly that has contracted out service delivery to the for-profit
sector. Ibid. at 129.
78Ibid at 134.
79 
"British Columbia," supra note 69 at 16.
80 Ibid
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combination of a social work philosophy of support for families with actual
material resources to provide that support, as well as a widespread
recognition among frontline workers that the crucial factor in child neglect
is poverty rather than individual moral failings st Importantly, these changes
took place in the realm of program development and social work practice
and without much formal recognition on the face of the governing statutes.
However, a brief look at developments in Aboriginal communities during
the same period underscores, by contrast, the point that even an incomplete
patchwork of services in a political climate that emphasizes support rather
than correction can have a significant impact.
E. Aboriginal Child Welfare and the "Least DetrimentalAlternative"
Approach
The rise of the "least detrimental alternative" approach in the
administration and practice of child welfare within provincial jurisdictions
coincided roughly with federal dismantling of the residential school system
and the extension, through federal provincial agreements, of provincial
child welfare laws to Aboriginal children.!' However, many of the services
and benefits aimed at supporting families were unavailable to Aboriginal
communities, compounding the legacy of decades of colonialism.
Underfunding was routinely explained during this period as a problem of
federal-provincial bickering over resources and jurisdiction rather than as
a problem of racism and colonialism. "- In addition, the notion that
Aboriginal children were in some sense constructively at risk given the
extent of economic and social devastation within their communities
pervaded both social work practice and judicial child-welfare discoursefp
As a result, the implementation of provincial child welfare regimes in
Aboriginal communities during this period resulted in the notorious "sixties
scoop," namely the apprehension of large numbers of children, many of
whom were adopted out or permanently committed to the guardianship of
"Policy and Legislative Context," supra note 13 at 39.
82 Note, however, that both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal children in socially marginalized
populations continued to find themselves categorized often asjuienile delinquents and relegated to
residential-style institutions. See, for example, . Sangster. "Girls in Conflict vith the La= Eplonng
the Construction of Female 'Delinquency' in Ontario, 194.9" 2V'(Z) 12 C.M\1L 1.
Monture, supra note I at 9-11.
84 Ibid. at 12-15.
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the state.' Thus, while overall numbers of children in care dropped, the
proportion of Aboriginal children in care rose sharply, from almost none
to numbers that far exceeded Aboriginal representation in the overall
population.86 In sum, Aboriginal communities were subjected to the
harshest impacts of the residual model without any of the moderating
effects of the preventive, support, and advocacy services available more
generally to non-Aboriginal Canadians. The individualized framework
characteristic of all liberal child-welfare regimes ensured the erasure of
considerations relating to racism and colonialism in Aboriginal child
welfare cases.87 Likewise, the dominance of the social-work philosophy of
permanency planning ensured that the least detrimental alternative for
Aboriginal children was the most detrimental measure possible from a
systemic perspective, namely removal and adoption.'
F. Social Democratic Conceptions of Child Welfare: Interventionist or
Non-Interventionist
This sketch of Canadian child welfare law and policy from the 1940s
to the end of the 1970s illustrates how the intervention/non-intervention
schematic oversimplifies and distorts the nature of state/family relations
underlying child welfare regulation. The "least detrimental alternative"
approach is commonly referred to in the literature as the non-
interventionist approach.89 A Supreme Court of Canada case, Catholic
Children'sAid Society of Toronto v. C.M., dealing with the interpretation of
the 1984 Ontario statute, observed that "when compared to the legislation
of other provinces, (it) has been recognized as one of the least
interventionist regimes." ''9 The statute in question contained detailedprovisions committing Ontario to the "least detrimental alternative"
85 The term "sixties scoop" was coined by Patrick Johnston in P. Johnston, Native Children and the
Child Welfare System (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1983). Johnston's report exposed the devastating
impact of provincial child welfare regimes on aboriginal communities and sent "shock waves" through
the child welfare system. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 42, vol. 3 at
24.
86 Johnston, ibid. at 54-57.
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"Child Welfare Law," supra note 1.
88 Ibid. See also, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 42, vol. 3 at 24;
Child and Family Services Act, supra note 75 at 29; and Monture, supra note 1.
8 9 Before the Best, supra note 65.
90[1994] 2 S.C.R. 165 at 191 [hereinafter C.M.] citing Richard Barnhorst, supra note 12.
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approach. 1 To the extent that this approach in its original incarnation did
signal a drop in overall apprehensions, the term "non-interventionist" is
accurate. However, from a perspective that views intervention positively
and measures it in terms of the social democratic recognition of public
collective responsibility for social and economic need, these regimes during
a short period from the mid 1960s to the early 1970s were actually more
interventionist. Furthermore, from the perspective of mothers, who are
expected to and do perform the bulk of nurturing children's well-being, this
understanding of intervention is pivotal in assessing what child welfare has
to say about the nature of the liberal community and of the terms of
women's citizenship within that community. The fact that this fuller, more
embodied account of citizenship was racially specific as well as deeply
gendered again belies the usefulness of the intervention/non-intervention
paradigm. Later research on the attenuated version of these programs that
survived into the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates that even the comparatively
generous benefits available in non-Aboriginal communities were premised
on terms aimed at securing a gendered order of parenting work. 2 Thus,
again, the question about the extent of state intervention tends to sideline
the crucial question about how the state intervenes and about the political
and ideological nature of state/family relations.
III. THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE, PRIVATIZATION, AND CHILD
WELFARE LAW
A. Historical and Contntual Features of Neo-liberalism
The defining features of neo-liberal public policy are the emphasis
on fiscal restraint, "the subordination of social policy to the demands of
labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness,"' the dismantling
of universal social programs, and anti-statism. The citizen of the neo-liberal
state is the self-reliant taxpayer citizen who expects a direct return on any
investment in social spending.' The resulting realignment of ideological
91 Child and Family SerriceAc4 supra note 76, ss. I(b), (c).
9 2 See discus-sion in CM. infia notes 128-132; and J. IKrane's research. ifra notes 183-190.
93 J. Brodie, "Restructuring and the New Citizenship'in 1. Ba!ker, cd., Rcthin!;mg Rstnitumn3.
Genderand Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toranto Press, 1996) 12640 at 130 [hereinafter
"Restructuring"].
94 See J. Shields & B.M. E ns, Shrinmtg the State: Globlization and Fthet Admwmsratwn
'Reform" (Halifa=c Ferovood, 1993) at 80.
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assumptions about the relation of the state to the market and family has
rejuvenated classical liberal values and rhetoric but with one important
difference: the state of nature is a globalized market, unaccountable to and
unmanageable by national democratic institutions."
In Canada, the key event marking the beginning of the shift to a
neo-liberal political order was the demise of the federal Liberals' ambitious
plan in the early 1970s to expand and rationalize social security programs
in order "to free personal social services from their residual straitjacket and
move them toward a modern, institutional response to the human problems
of urban-industrial society."96 Unemployment and inflation spurred by the
1973 energy crisis fueled "demands for more use of demonstrated need, a
curtailment of universal programs, and a cutback in government spending
generally."97 An explicitly neo-liberal agenda marked by cuts to social
programs, regressive tax policies, and reduced transfer payments to the
provinces under c~r was consolidated and pursued at the federal level in
the 1980s by the Mulroney Conservative government. 8 Although the
federal Liberals returned to power in 1993 under Jean Chretien, the stage
was set for a "shift to the political right."99 The 1995 federal budget
accomplished this shift, consolidating and entrenching the new political
order, and radically restructuring jurisdiction over and funding of social
programmes. The use of conditions inserted in federal transfer payments
to the provinces to impose terms reflective of social democratic ideals on
provincial social spending and regulation was abandoned, except with
respect to health care and residency requirements in income assistance. At
the same time, federal transfer payments were significantly reduced. A new
funding formula called the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHsT) was
put in place, marking the end of a conception of Canadian citizenship in
terms of a collective commitment to ensuring social and economic
security."°
The key terms and institutions for implementing this political shift
cannot be found in any formal constitutional text despite the foundational
95 Ibd at 24-34.
96 Guest, supra note 47 at 173.
97 Ibi. at 180.
98Ibid. at 217-18.
99 Ibid at 250.
100See generally, A. Moscovitch, "The Canada Health and Social Transfer" in WelfareState, supra
note 97 at 105-120; and M. Jackman," Women and the Canada Health and Social Transfer: Ensuring
Gender Equality in Federal Welfare Reform" (1995) C.J.W.L 371.
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nature of the realignment of the political order. As vith its assembly, the
texts setting out the disassembly of the Canadian velfare state are more
likely to be found in intergovernmental agreements and budgets.
Nevertheless, the struggle over the normative and political values at stake
is clearly evident in constitutional discourse. In broad political terms, the
neo-liberal project of privatization entails a deliberate recommitment to
and endorsement of the residual model of welfare under which primary
responsibility for individual need resides in the market and the family while
the state performs only a minimal back-up role. However, the ideological
and normative understanding of the residual model under neo-Iiberalism
differs importantly from classical liberalism. Efficiency and economic
changes as well as, and sometimes instead of, the principles of human
freedom and individual dignity are invoked as the rationale for state
restructuring. For example, in constitutional division of powers discourse,
economic imperatives are a dominant theme in the recurrent debates over
constitutionally entrenching an amended set of relations between the
federal and provincial governments and between those governments and
the Canadian economy.01
Neo-liberal ideals also surface in the Charterdiscourse of rights, not
only in a rejuvenation of the classical liberal principles of negative liberty
and formal equality, but also in the introduction of the neo-liberal discourse
of privatization. The latter is represented by a pattern in judicial decisions
favouring claims for equal access to private forms of economic support and
protection and explicitly disfavouring claims that assert a right to public
benefits." The distinction between private and public benefit programs
typically arises in the context of section 1 analysis. Protecting the "public
purse" has been identified as a substantial and compelling objective of
regimes that facilitate private responsibility for need" '3 and as a basis for
deference toward legislative decisions regarding the appropriate
101 See J. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, cds., Social Justicc and the Conlitutton- Per-cti es on
a Social Union for Canadas (Ottawa: Carleton Unhe inty Pres, 1921. See cyacally. D.
Schneiderman, "The Constitutional Politics of Poverty" at 125; H. Glasbcck,"The Social Charter Poar
Politics for the Poor" at 115; and H. Lessard, "Creation Stones: Social Rights and Canada's Soaal
Contract," at 101-14.
102 See H. Lessard etaL, "Developments in Constitutional Law," (1593) 7 Supreme Court LR, 81
at 100.
103 A. v. H., [19991 2 S.C.R. 67,69,72, per Cory and lacobucci J.J. for the majority.
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distribution of public resources."t° Conversely, insignificant impacts on the
"public purse" are invoked to justify remedying public benefit programs
that fail to meet Charter standards of inclusiveness and respect for
fundamental justice."0 5
The political shift to neoliberalism has been characterized by
several governmental strategies, among them the use of a tax credit rather
than direct-benefit system for redistributing wealth,"° the replacement of
the principle of universality with targeted programs in areas such as old age
security, family allowances, and income assistance," and privatization."t3
The residual mold of income assistance programs, softened during the
Keynesian era by the language of reasonableness and human dignity, has
re-emerged full force with a reinvigorated moralistic rhetoric and revival of
the notion of the "undeserving poor.""° The latter has been applied with
particular force and consistency to single mothers."0 Targeting programs
in this manner serves to "pathologize and individualize difference and
imposes a stigma that places members of the target group 'outside the
norms of the new citizenship. ' ' . Although all of these strategies transform
the nature of citizenship, privatization strategies translate most directly into
a realignment of fundamental relationships between the state and society.
Privatization also stands in a peculiar relation to child welfare, given the
historical role of voluntary, non-profit, and commercial institutions in
delivering state funded child welfare services and given the centrality of the
10 4 Egan v. Canada, [199512 S.C.R. 513 at 572, per Sopinka J. concurring in result; and Collins v.
Canada, [2000] 2 F.C. 3 (T.D.) at 60-61 and 65-69. The latter decision was heralded in the press as
signaling judicial awareness of the need for fiscal prudence. "Hooray for Reasoned Law" The Globe
and Mail (8 November 1999) A18.
105 Schacter v. Canada, [ 1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; G. (J) v. New Brunswick, supra note 2 at 92-94; and
discussion infra note 176.
106 For example, the 1988 federal budget restructured family allowance benefits, introducing a
system of child tax credits to redistribute benefits to low- and moderate-income parents. Guest, supra
note 47 at 225.
10 7
"Restructuring," supra note 93 at 136-37.
108 See generally, Privatization, supra note 18.
109 P. Evans, "Single Mothers and Ontario's Welfare Policy" in . Brodie, ed., Women and
Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996) 151 at 160; and M. Little, "No Car, No Radio,
No Liquor Permit": The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario, 1920-1997 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1998) 139.
110 Little, ibid. at 157- 63 describes policy shifts in Ontario that increasingly favoured tying social
assistance to employment, with particularly severe impacts on single mothers.
I"Restructuring," supra note 93 at 137.
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ideology of familial privacy to child welfare. Thus, I vill focus on
privatization and privatization discourse in examining the reconfiguration
of child welfare under neo-liberalism.
Although child welfare in Canada has always been cast in the
privatized mold in both the substantive and methodological sense, child
welfare programs were significantly re-privatized in the 19SOs and 1990s. In
the 1980s, the acceleration of broad cost-cutting measures aimed at the
benefit provision and preventive aspects of social programs began to
undermine the family support interpretation of the "least detrimental
alternative" philosophy."' In the 1990s-not surprisingly given the
cumulative impact of cuts to support services-a number of child velfare
"scandals" fueled media and political attacks on the "least detrimental
alternative" approach and a demand for a return to the emphasis on
intervention, child removal, and correction associated with an earlier, more
clearly residual model of child welfare regulation.
B. The 1980s: Child Welfare and the Double Meaning of the "Least
Detrimental Alternative "
Tracking the shift to a neo-liberal model of child welfare in Canada
is difficult given that no Canadian child welfare regime fully embraced an
institutional model. Insteadwhat occurred was more complex. The residual
model was moderated by deleting the "offence" sections, gradually
removing the language of moral correction and maintenance of the social
order, replacing it, at least in part, with the welfarist language of "best
interests," and shifting emphasis and resources towards family support
rather than child removal as a more effective method of addressing child
neglect. This latter shift to the "least detrimental alternative" approach
found formal expression in statutes often long after it had been adopted as
a practice. The rhetoric of the "least detrimental alternative" and of family
autonomy was linked ostensibly to classical liberal ideals of negative
liberty.' However, in a political climate that at least partially embraced
social democratic ideals and in a favourable economic climate, the liberal
rhetoric had a social democratic tone. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
112 R. Chisholm, writing in 19S7 about the United States and Australia, observed that "there may
well be a connection between permanency planning and the limited a%aflabilty of funds for _f.eial
welfare in the 1970s and 19SOs" and that in examining the endorsement bygowcrnmcntsof rzrmancney
planning rhetoric and programmes, it is often difficult to di entangle the cot-cutting objcctcs from
those relating to children's welfare." Chisholm,supra note 63 at 211-12.
See discussion of Before the Best, supra note 65.
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family autonomy with respect to child welfare meant that children at risk
should be supported within their families by helping families cope with
parenting. In the 1980s, family autonomy began to lean in the opposite
direction: that families should be responsible and that child welfare services
and resources be reduced. Existing privatized modes of delivery were
supported for reasons of cost-effectiveness rather than for reasons of
pluralism and community empowerment.
A variety of forms of privatization of child welfare took place in
British Columbia during the 1980s. They ranged from cabinet decisions to
repeal regulations providing support services, reducing government
responsibility for the long-term care of children by favouring adoption over
foster care, cutting staff, replacing institutional care for special needs
children with family or community services that are less comprehensive and
accessible, and, finally, contracting out service delivery to private sector
organizations. 4 All of these changes were instituted without any
substantial amendment of the Family and Child Services Act enacted by the
Social Credit government in 1980.
In Ontario, two scathing reports in 1976 and 1977 on the
disorganized, erratically funded, and ineffective regime of children's
services prompted the formation of the Children's Services Division with
the mandate to improve the delivery of services in a cost-effective manner.
The government stipulated that no increase in spending and no
change in the mix of private and public services would be acceptable 1
These restraints precluded an institutional approach." 6 Instead the
recommended reforms were administrative in nature, urging integration of
services in one ministry, standardization and guidelines for service
providers, better communication and monitoring, and reconfiguring existing
funding. n7
Ontario rendered its reform agenda into positive law in two stages.
An interim statute, The Child Welfare Act, was enacted in 1978. As in the
1980 British Columbia statute, it gave a central role, for the first time, to
the doctrinal test of the "best interests of the child" in structuring judicial
discretion." 8 However, unlike the British Columbia version, Ontario's
statute provided interpretive guidelines with respect to the meaning of the
114See generally, "British Columbia," supra note 69.
115Hurl, supra note 19 at 399.
116 Ibid.
11 7 Ibid,
11 8 Chid Welfare Act, 1978, supra note 75, s. 30.
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"best interests" test that gave specific emphasis to "least detrimental
alternative" values such as continuity and the integrity of parent-child
relationships. n9 In 1984 a more comprehensive statute, the Child and
Family Services Act, was enacted that articulated in lengthy and detailed
introductory sections the purposes of childwelfare lav,.'*These subsections
repeated the commitments to continuity'-" and family integrity"" and
explicitly used the language of the "least restrictive or disruptive course of
action."' In addition to giving a firm "family support" content to the"best
interests" test, the statute tightened the definition of "children in need of
protection," discarding the word "neglect" altogether and imposing a high
threshold for apprehensions that are motivated by ill-defined concerns
about psychological and emotional harms. Specific directives indicating
respect for cultural and religious difference as well as Aboriginal concerns
for autonomy and the continuity of cultural and social traditions gave the
statute's family support theme an explicitly pluralist tone.'2 However, the
principles articulated were too vague to cause disagreement or to provide
guidance, and the scheme failed to place a "specific duty on the state or its
agencies to promote the interests and welfare of children," instead adhering
to a negative stance regarding familial and children's interests."
With well-resourced preventive and support programs, the precisely
worded constraints on apprehension and committal to state care in the 1984
Ontario statute might have functioned as a safety mechanism in a regime
designed to ensure children's well-being in concrete material terms within
their families and their cultural communities. However, as the experience
of the 1990s made clear, without material support for the principles of
community and family integrity, these radically reformulated regimes
operated in much the same way as the residual models of the earliest period
of Canadian welfare history. The new legislation was, in its essential
attributes, residual in style, envisioning fewer mandated services, privatized
delivery of whatever services were contemplated, and a deployment of such
1 1 9 Ibid., s. 1(b).
12 0 Child and Family Sen-ice Act, supra note 75.
21 bad, I0).
122 Ibids. 1(b).
123 bil, s. I(c).
124Tbd, as. I(e), (i).
12 5 N. Bala,"The Children'sAct: A Consultation Paper-Chld Welfare Reform in Ontaro' 1933
4 CJ.F.L 233 at 236 [hereinafter"The Children's Act"), commenting on the reform protpaZlSleadng
up the 1984 legislation. See also, Hurl, supra note 19 at 402,
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services only after a family is found to be at risk 2 6 Nicholas Bala wrote with
respect to the theme of seeking "the least disruptive ... course of action"
that characterized studies leading up to the enactment of the 1984 statute:
"Perhaps it is not too cynical to note that intervention is expensive and
some of the concern about 'overintervention' may be viewed as a disguised
attempt to reduce government expenditures on child welfare."' t"
C. State Intervention or Non-Intervention?: Catholic Children's Aid v.
cm. 128
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada in CM.
characterized the 1984 Ontario statute as the most non-interventionist of
the new wave of Canadian child welfare laws, pointing to the legalistic and
detailed constraints on social worker and judicial discretion and the theme
of respect for families. In formal terms, the British Columbia statute in
force at the time-the Family and Child Services Act-might very well
represent the other end of the spectrum, namely the harshly interventionist
model with its conferring of large unstructured discretion on social workers
and judges, thinly veiled moralistic tone, and heavy reliance on child
removal. A closer look at C.M. illustrates, again, how the intervention/non
intervention framework can easily mislead.
The case concerned C.M., a woman who came to Canada from
Portugal at the age of twenty and worked in a number of service and factory
jobs before giving birth to her daughter, S.M., in 1986. Her history
thereafter is beset with difficulties that brought child welfare authorities
into C.M.'s life shortly after S.M.'s birth.Y9 Ultimately, after legal
proceedings that stretched over five years, the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld an order making S.M. a Crown ward for the purposes of adoption.
The reasons for the Court by Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 are, in part,
about the importance of "intervening" in light of the paramountcy of the
"best interests" principle and notwithstanding the "family support" theme
126 Hurl, ibid at 402-03.
127 "The Children's Act," supra note 125 at 239. Note that this commentator has flipped the
meaning of intervention to mean support rather than repression, illustrating how easily the language
of state intervention sustains contradictory meanings.
128 C.M., supra note 90.
Immigration authoritis forced S.M.'s father to leave a year after her birth. S.M. was either in
care or under supervision by child welfare from the time she was a month old. C.M. was hospitalized
for a period after rushing into a bank with S.M. screaming that someone was trying to kill her. Supra
note 136 at 321-22.
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of the statute.'" However, it is possible to argue that the non-
interventionist slant in the Ontario regime is contained not in its
commitment to family autonomy and continuity of parent-child
relationships but in its failure to provide supports for families struggling
with systemically rooted issues of need and discrimination. The failure to
provide social supports is compounded by the specific barriers of
intertwined racism and sexism faced by immigrant women in C.M.'s
situation. Overall, the significance of the formal legal differences between
the Ontario and British Columbia regimes at the time of the case is
effectively erased, especially for women who are poor and who are subject
to the disadvantaging effects of multi-faceted systemic inequalities.,
Rather than seeing the result in C.M. as the interventionist exception that
proves the non-interventionist rule, I suggest it can be characterized, as the
enforcement of a fundamentally non-interventionist, i.e., non-supportive,
stance through the most severe of remedial options under the statute,
permanent removal of a child.""
D. The 1990s: Backlash Against Neglectfid Families atd the Return to an
Earlier Model of Residualism
The obfuscation of the nature of stateffamily relations by the
terminology of intervention/non-intervention was given an even greater
boost by the most recent chapter in child welfare reform. The cumulative
effect of many years of cutting back support services, staff, and resources
resulted in the 1990s in unwieldy caseloads for service providers and the
channeling of scarce resources into managing and monitoring caseloads
instead of directly assisting and supporting parenting work. Highly
publicized cases of mismanaged files in which children at risk were subject
to appalling neglect and abuse while being monitored by child welfare
Ibi i at 336.
131C. Sheppard, "Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered Questions: LesZons from ,e °y
(1995) 12 CJ.F.L 283 at 322-28.
132 Elaine Freedman has written about instances in which courts hate fipped the meaning of
"intervention" in the way that I suggest. i.e., to mean an entitlement to 'uppart rather than the
application of the state's coercive powers in the form of child removal. For eample, she descrbes one
case in which a judge was deeply critical of child %elfare authorities v.ho offered no srices before
apprehension, relentingonlyat the insistence of the motherslavyer tv:oyearslater. The Judge ordered
the child be returned and services provided. E. Freedman, "Parents' Rights and the Best Interests of
Children Under the Child and Family Services Act" (1994) 11 Can. Fain. LQ. 215 at 233. citing C.4S
of Hamilton-Mentworth v. M(M.) [19921 W.D.F.L 1158 (Oat. U. Fam. CL).
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authorities fueled calls in the 1990s for child-welfare reform in almost every
province in Canada.
British Columbia's experience illustrates the collision of several
contradictory notions of the meaning and purpose of child welfare with
drastic consequences for the social workers, families, and children involved.
Here, the turn to the "least detrimental alternative" model of legal
regulation came much later than in other provinces. The Social Credit's
1980 statute was finally replaced by the ND? government in 1994 by the
Child, Family, and Community Service Act. 133 The new statute resembled
Ontario's mid-1980s reform in its basic features, namely highly legalized,
precise, and restrictive criteria to structure social worker and judicial
discretion 134 combined with the language of family autonomy 135 and least
disruption, 136 more attention to cultural and religious pluralism,3' and
qualified recognition of Aboriginal concerns about cultural continuity and
community survival. 38 Unlike the Ontario reform, the British Columbia
statute contained firmer commitments to material support for families in
distress.139 However, as in Ontario, the enactment of the statute was
accompanied by an administrative reorganization aimed at efficiency
through centralization and better communication and monitoring rather
than a rethinking of child welfare objectives. 41 Furthermore, its
introduction to the legislature was temporarily derailed by a public scandal
that typifies events in other provinces.
The furor arose over the death of a child, Matthew Vaudreuil, while
under supervision of the Ministry. Judge Thomas J. Gove was appointed to
conduct an inquiry into the matter. He demanded and obtained a
suspension of the legislative process while he completed a report that
13 3 Supra note 75.
134 Ibid., ss. 13, 35-36,41, 49.
13 5 Ibid., s. 2(b).
136 Ibid., ss. 4(1)(c), 30(1)(b), 33(1)(d).
137Ibid., ss. 3(c), 4(e).
138 Ibid, ss. 1, 2(f), 3(b), 34(3)(d), 39(I)(c), 49(2)(c--d).
13 9 ibid.,ss. 5, 6(4)(a). These provisions are phrased in terms of an obligation on service providers
to consider offering support services. However, under Part 4 of the Act dealing with the rights of
children in care, an affirmative right to food, clothing and nurture is asserted. Ibid., s. 70(1).
140 In 1996, responsibility for child welfare services was moved from the Ministry of Social Services
to a newly created Ministry for Children and Families. The new Ministry brought together programs
directed at families and children that had previously been located in five different ministries. Hall,supra
note 12 at 138-39.
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castigated the family- centred approach of the proposed legislation, linking
it to Matthew Vaudreuil's death."4 ' When the legislation was finally enacted
in 1996, it contained Judge Gove's recommendations With regard to making
child safety paramount, suspending provisions that would give families
whose children were under the care of the Ministry greater participation in
developing plans for those children, and introducing a service delivery
approach that shifted social workers' role more in the direction of law
enforcement and away from family support., Judge Gove's
recommendations for administrative reform were also followed up,
including the creation of a Children's Commissioner."' Although the
Commissioner's statutory mandate is fairly broad, the obligation to inquire
into children's deaths remains its most highly publicized function."
In 1997, yet another shocking child abuse situation hit the press.
Maxis Flanders had been under supervision by the Ministry. Her two-year-
old child was found clinging to her body six days after she had died from a
drug overdose.4'5 Areport by the Children's Commissioner pointed out that
the mother, contrary to the Minister's assurances to the legislature, had not
received services to treat her addiction from the Ministry.' Cutbacks to
support programs, overloaded social workers, and the general lack of
resources was identified in the media as key factors contributing to the
tragedy.147 In particular, it was pointed out that Flanders, as an Aboriginal
141British Columbia, Report of the Gore Inquiry in Chfd Procection, %ot4 2. (Victoria: Mmni-tii of
Social Services, 1995) at 207-03,243-47 [hereinafter"Go,,"]. See also, Hall, Pipra note 12 at 13.5-41.
142 Gove, ibid., vol. 3, recommendation fS at 6,R: and rccommendattons 7) at 85. Hall comments
that the report also sarked a reviion of the child protection %vorker's role as a "highly trained
'specialist,' aided by the police..." and observes that the connection vith the plice may ser e to utify
the "kind of judgmental, authoritarian, and coercive bpha~iour tow:arJs strangers that vrould be
intolerable in the private citizen." Hall, ibd. at 141.
143 Gove, ibid, vol. 3, recommendations 49-50 at 61; Chddrcn's Coelnuw=tn Act, S.BC 197, c.
11. Hall, ibid. at 141-43.
144 Hall, ibid.
145 "Tot Tried Waking His Dead Mother" The Toronto Star t29 March 1997) All; and "Tot
Trapped Week With Dead Moma" The [Toronto] Sun !29 March 1997} 31
146"A Reality Check" The [ ancourer] Sun (5 July 1M971 A 2, The Commisaoner made it clear
that the Minister, Penny Priddy, v~as not misleading the legilature but that the had not been kept v.l
informed by her staff. Ibid.
147J. Hunter, "Workers Reject Blame for Addict Mom" The [t anccztcr] Sun (5 July l wi At;
J. Hunter, "Addict Was On Wait List for Rehab Program" The It ancout cr] Sun (3 July 19)71 Bl; and
T. Barrett, "Chabasco's Legacy" The [I ancourcr] Sun (12 July 1997) Cl,
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woman, was particularly vulnerable because of the lack of culturally
sensitive services for off-reserve Aboriginal persons. 4 8
Meanwhile, social workers, caught in a double bind of depleted
resources and public demands for better supervision of cases, began to
resort to "preventive" child removal. Between 1995 and 1998, the number
of children in care in British Columbia rose from 6,000 to 10,000.49 When
more than seventy-one children, roughly one third of them Aboriginal,
were apprehended in Quesnel over the short space of two and one-half
months at the end of 1997, the uproar in the community resulted in a
review by the Children's Commissioner.' Without waiting for the results
of the review, the NDP government admitted that workloads for its child
protection workers were too high.15' Although the Commissioner's report
on Quesnel did not address the case load issue, it did point to a number of
resource-related deficiencies in the Quesnel office including inadequate
monitoring of children at risk, the absence of protocols for First Nations,
and a lack of support for families at risk.1 2
The Ontario experience in the 1990s may foreshadow reforms to
come in other parts of Canada. Public scandals about mismanaged cases of
preventable child abuse and neglect were followed by public inquiries and
reports."5 Ontario, like British Columbia, also experienced a steep rise in
the numbers of children in care during this period." ) Much of the press
coverage identified funding cuts to staff and to preventive programs as a
148 P. McMartin, "While a Scapegoat is Sought in the Flanders Case, Women Continue to Die"
The [Vancouver] Sun (7 July 1997) Bi.
149 K. Pemberton, "B.C. to Give Troubled Teens Money to Live on Their Own" The [Vancouver]
Sun (28 July 1999) Al [hereinafter "Troubled Teens").
150 B. McClintock, "Morton Launches Quesnel Probe" The [Vancouver] Province (5 April 1998)
A7; and D. Rinehart, "More Social Workers Sent to Quesnel," The [Vancouver] Sun (10 February
1998). The Minister admitted that the proportion of Aboriginal children was"unconscionably high" but
in line with the ratio across the Province and thus part of a broader issue. Rinehart, ibid.
B. McLintock & K. Tait, "Child-Protection Push On" The [Vancouver] Province (21 April
1998) A14.
152 K. Pemberton, "Quesnel Child Removals Justified" The [Vancouver] Sun (10 June 1998) A3.
153 C. Mallan, "New Plan in Place to Spot Kids at Risk" The [Toronto] Star (3 July 1997) Al.
Mallan's article points to a report of the Ontario Child Mortality Task Force and the "inquests into the
deaths of Shanay Johnson, the twenty-one month-old toddler beaten to death in 1993 by her crack-
cocaine-addicted mother, and Kasandra Shepherd, a three year-old beaten to death by her stepmother
in 1991" as the impetus for calls to reform Ontario's child welfare system. Ibid
'4 J. Wells, "Life in Limbo" Elm Street 4:5 (April 2000) 92-100. Wells reports that between 1995
and 1999 the number of children in care in Ontario increased by 35 per cent. Ibid. at 95.
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key factor in what was characterized as a "child-protection crisis.""s Some
included cuts to the broader array of government supports to indigent
families in describing the social and economic underpinning of the crisis
with respect to children.15 In a furor over the slashing of a program aimed
at "helping families keep the kids off the street, out of care, and living at
home," the Ministry of Community and Social Services confirmed that
Children's Aid Societies had been directed to spend money "largely on
protecting children who were already in the care of child welfare agencies,
or in need of imminent care, and not for programs that prevent children
from being taken into care." I5 However, the legal framework contained in
the Child and Family Services Act 1984, in particular its "non-
interventionist" approach so touted in the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in CI.., also came in for persistent criticism. 3
In 1998, the near-death of baby McCutcheon, a toddler whose
extreme malnourishment and chronic illness failed to attract the attention
of child-care workers despite a record of forty-eight visits, was blamed on
the legislative posture of support for family autonomy and the lack of any
provision for protection from neglect, short of extreme danger."9 Other
more contextual factors in the McCutcheon case-that the family was
barely subsisting on the mother's monthly disability cheque, that the mother
155 See, for example, D. Rogers, "CAs crisis prompts hinng spree" Tie [Otaiwa] Citizcn (24 June
1998) E17; . Tait, "We Could do Better" The ]Hanulton] SFcrator (Z0 July I993) NI; T, Blackt,ell,
"Province Plans to Study Child Neglect and Abuse," The [Hanntlonj Spt.ctatr (22 August 1937) D3.
pointing out that the Harris Conservative government has cut Children's. Ad Society budgets by S17
million a year, and IL Bohuslawsky,"Kasonde Inquest Resumes" The [Ottawa) Citizen (26 May 19 7)
Dl. Bohuslawsky identified, among other factors underlying the 1995 murder of tvo children by their
father, a budget cut to the Children's Aid Society of lose to S4 millionw,.ith a concomitant 23-1zr- cent
increase in new and re-opened cases. Ibid. See also, D. Wood & G. Crone. "No New Money for Child
Welfare, Policy Expert Says" The [Hamilton] Spectator (4 July 1997) B3 [hereinafter "No Mone"J,
citing expert testimony to the effect that, because of the lack of funding, "ower the past fe;'w years,
Children's Aid Societies have begun focusing only on cases they legally must take %here children are
in need of protection." Ib
156 See, for example, C. Blatchford, "CAS Disconnected from Ugly Reality" The ITewrntol Sun
(17 April 1997) 5; and J. Lakey, "Workfare Parents Face Day-Care Squeeze" The (Ternto] Star (23
February 1998) BI.
157 R. Harvey, "Program to StopRunaways: Chopped Children's Aid Blames Pro; incial Changes
in Welfare Funding" The [Toronto] Star (3 April 1999) B3.
15 See, for example,"No Money," supra note 164; D. Wod, "Many Turned a Deaf Ear to Alarm
Bells" The [Hamilton] Spectator (12 July 1997) A13. citing concern by experts that the Ontario
legislation did not protect against child neglect; and D. A Freed, "Stiffer Lavws Urged as Shana)'s
Legacy" The [Toronto] Star (10 May 1997) Al.
159 P. Orwen, -The Sony Scandal of Baby W The (Toronto] Star (25 October 1993) Bl.
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was afraid of letting workers know there was no food in the house, that
"family support" took the form of written pamphlets despite the fact that
the mother's mental disabilities rendered her unable to read them-were
minimized, and, instead, blame was pinned on the law itself by the
Children's Aid Society." After commissioning a report that recommended
substantially broadening the legal basis for apprehending children, 16' the
Harris Conservative government began the process in 1998 of amending the
legislation to correct what was identified by politicians and the press as the
misguided legislative direction to social workers to preserve the family unit
and to seek alternatives to removal of children. The new amendments had
broad support across the political spectrum 62 and were proclaimed on 31
March 2000.263
The shift in approach represented by the new legislation in Ontario
is signaled by the opening declaration of principles that gives the "best
interests, protection and well-being of children" a clear position of
superiority with respect to the other enumerated principles1" In addition,
the revised declaration stipulates that the "least disruptive course of action"
need now only be "considered" rather than "followed." 65 Perhaps the most
important feature of the changes, however, is the reintroduction of broader
more discretionary grounds for finding a child in need of protection,
including the vague ground of "neglect." Specifically, the statutory regime
can now be triggered by a finding that harm to a child has resulted from a
"pattern of neglect" in the care, supervision, provision for or protection of
160 Orwen, ibid.
161 Ontario, Protecting Vulnerable Children: Report of the Panel of Experts on Child Protection
(Toronto: 1998) (Chair: Justice M.J. Hatton). For a discussion of the Report, see N. Bala, "Reforming
Ontario's Childand Family ServicesAct: Is the Pendulum Swinging Back Too Far?" (1999) 17 C.F.LQ.
121 at 140-45 [hereinafter "Pendulum"]. Bala points out that the panel, chaired by Justice Mary Jane
Hatton, did not hold public hearings and favoured a more "interventionist" stance than Justice Gove's
report in B.C. ibid
162 T. Blackwell, "Opposition Agrees to Rapid Enactment of Child-Welfare Bill" National Post
[Toronto Edition] (27 April 1999) B2. Nicholas Bala described the legislative support for the bill
amending the Child and Family Services Act as a "virtually unprecedented display of unanimity."
"Pendulum," ibid. at 121.
163 Child and Family Services Amendment Act (Child Welfare Reform), 1999, S.O. 1999 C.2,
Proclamation, proclaimed in force 31 March 2000, 0. Gaz. 2000. 451.
164 Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-Il , s. 1, as am. by Child and Family Services
Amendment Act (Child Welfare Reform),1999, S.O. 1999, c.2, s. 1. The previous s. I declaration of
principles was ambiguous with respect to the relation among the principles, arguably presenting them
as on a par with each other.
165 Ibid.
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a child by the person in charge.lts Furthermore, the "emotional harm"
provisions now extend to "serious" rather than, as formerly, "severe"
behavioural indicators and "delayed development" has been added to the
list of indicators. 67 Finally, a court need only find a "risk" rather than a
"substantial risk," as set out in the previous regime, of these and the other
harms set out in the definition of a child in need of protection."" The lower
threshold contained in these provisions for the application of an array of
statutory remedies transforms the Ontario regime from what the C.(M).
Court described as the "least interventionist" model in Canada to a model
that more closely resembles the residual models of an earlier era, Finally,
the amendments have cut back the opportunities for parents of children in
care to regain custody of their children or, alternatively, maintain their
relationships with those children. 69
Recently, the turn toward responses that rely on the justice system
and law enforcement models rather than material support and preventive
programs, has taken the extreme form of calls for the criminalization of
parental neglect, bringing the trajectory of reform back to its initial starting
point at the end of the nineteenth century."" In November 1999,the federal
Justice department issued a report setting out proposals to criminalize
emotional abuse of children and child neglect, as well as failure to report
suspicions of child abuse or neglect."
In summary then, the philosophy of "least detrimental alternative"
and permanency planning that began to gain support in the 1960s and 1970s
was always susceptible to a reading that emphasized the essentially classical
liberal values of family privacy and negative liberty. However, in the context
of greater acceptance for more textured and positive notions of autonomy
as well as social democratic conceptions of the welfare function of the state,
166 Ibi, s. 37(2)(a), as am. by S.O. 1999, c. 2, s, 911t
167Ibid., s. 37(2)(f), as am. by S.O. 1999, c. 2, s.9(4).
16S Ibid, s. 37(2)(b), as am. by S.O. 1999, c. 2, s. 9(2); s. 37(2)(d), as am. by SO. 1999, c. ,5.9(3);
and s. 37(2)(g), as am. by S.O. 1999, c. 2 s. 9(4).
169 Ibid, s. 29(6), as am, by S.O. 1999 c. 2, s. 3(2); s. 7011-2), as am. by S.O. 1999, c.2, & 21(I); and
s. 59(2-3), as am. by S.O. 1999, e. 2, s. 16. See also, "Pendulum,"s-upra note 170 at 152-53.
170See, for example, C. Phillips & G. Gallov.ay, "Police Say Boy Murdered" The [Hardian]
Spectator (4 October 1997) Al; and "Judge Questions the Role of Child-Care wVorlkers" 7x[Tfn noj
Star (3 July 199S) BS.
171 Canada, Department of Justice, Child l7ctns and the Criminal Justxe S.stea (Consultation
Paper), online: <http:w,,v.,.canada.justice.gc.caenfconc'chldk1e1.html> (lart modified:29NNovembzr
1999). See also, E. Cherne, -Ottava looks at Criminahzaing Emotional Abuse of Children" Ivattonal
Post [Ail But Toronto Edition] (27 November 1999) Al.
2001] 757
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the family-centred social work philosophy in its original manifestation
facilitated a more collective understanding of public responsibility for the
material and social well-being of children and their families. This occurred
despite the expansion of privatized rather than public modes of service
delivery. Social-welfare programs during this period were criticized for
entrenching a gendered, heterosexist, and racialized notion of the citizen
that presumed and enforced the privatization of familial work such as
parenting, and its relegation, for the most part, to the sphere of unpaid or
underpaid work. Nevertheless, the ideal of a more textured and embodied
citizen opened up space for an anti-racist, engendered, anti-heterosexist,
and particularized politics of liberal citizenship.172
Retrenchment to a neo-liberal political order, beginning in the
1970s and consolidating in the next two decades, turned the social
democratic ideal on its head. Privatization became a means of reducing
public responsibility for need and of replacing redistributive and social
equity priorities with cost-effectiveness, monitoring, and financial
accountability priorities. Family support became family privacy. The least
intrusion or disruption was easily translated into the negative right to be left
alone and permanency planning came under fire by critics as a transparent
method to cut costs, often meaning that children were left alone within
their original families or within court-sanctioned substitute families.173 The
key indicators of this distinction between two radically different
interpretations of child welfare law and practice are not easily visible. The
formal language of the legal regimes is often highly misleading. Instead, the
political and constitutional character of child welfare is buried in provincial
budgets, in regulations setting out the criteria for access to social programs,
and in the terms of contracts between ministries and privately operated
service providers.
172 I.M. Young,Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)
at 81-91. Young describes a dialectic in which insurgent groups seek democratization and
empowerment at the local level while the institutions of welfare capitalism seek to depoliticize such
demands by reabsorbing them into the distributive apparatus of the welfare state. Welfare provision
under capitalism, on her account, both supports and stifles the formation of social movements that
pursue an ideal ofjustice incorporating both collective responsibility for material needs and substantive
democracy. Ibid
173 Chisholm, supra note 63 at 211-212.
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IV. REREADING G. (J.): EMPIRE OF THE LONE MOTHER OR
PRIVATIZED MOTHER-PROTECTION
It is at this point that G. (J.) enters the debate on the nature of child
welfare law. The case constitutionalizes a set of understandings about the
nature of state-family relations. However, in doing so it employs the open-
ended flexible vocabulary of rights discourse, a vocabulary that is subject to
multiple and often contradictory readings. Placing G.(J) against the
backdrop of the historical complexities of child welfare law brings into focus
some of the political currents that have, in the past as well as in the current
moment, freighted the empty language of parental sovereignty and familial
and individual privacy with particular meanings. In this section, I vll map
some of those interpretations and resonances.
In G.(J.) the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the applicant's
argument that section 7 protects parental rights and that, as an offshoot of
that protection, fundamental justice requires, at least in some
circumstances, the provision of publicly funded legal counsel in child
apprehension proceedings. Thus, remarkably, the case appears to depart
from the trend to delineate rights in narrow cautious terms as well as from
the growing judicial tendency to give the seal of constitutional approval to
the privatized and individualized character of responsibility for well-being
while withholding approval from a commitment to the public character of
social responsibility. A closer reading of both parts of the analysis-the
parental rights analysis and the fundamental justice analysis-yields a less
optimistic story.
A. Parental Rights: the Empire of the Lone Mother Protectors
The majority reasons by Chief Justice Lamer locate G.(J.)'s rights
under the rubric of security of the person, specifically the right to
psychological integrity. Doing so enables Chief Justice Lamer to leave
intact his own repeated statements that section 7 liberty should be confined
to a right of non-detention." 4 Liberty rights, however, are lurking quite
visibly beneath the surface of Chief Justice Lamer's reasons. The "serious
174 The Court returned to the issue of the scope of the liberty interest in Bkncce v. Nrkish
Columbia, [20001 2 S.C.R. 307 [hereinafter Blencoe], albeit in dicta and vath a slim majority of five out
of nine judges. Here, the majority reasons asserted that section 7 liberty e.tends beyond Chief Justice
Lamer's notion of freedom from physical restraint to protect a broader notion of ndividual autonomy
and freedom to make decisions of fundamental personal importance without state interference. IbAL
at 340, per Justice Bastarache. The other four judges in Blencc disagreed with the characterization of
the issue in the case as a Charter issue. Ibid at 333, per Justice LeBal, dis=enting in part.
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and profound effect" on G.(J.)'s psychological integrity, in Chief Justice
Lamer's account, arises from the "gross intrusion into a private and
intimate sphere" as well as the stigma associated with being found an unfit
parent in child protection proceedings. 7' The concerns about reputation
and a negative notion of familial privacy are rooted in classical liberalism's
vision of individual liberty. Thus, the interference with G.(J.)'s security of
the person upon which the analysis hinges consists, in essence, of the
stresses resulting from an interference with what would ordinarily be called
her liberty rights. Thus, by casting section 7 firmly in the classical liberal
mold wherein rights protect solitary and free individuals by reining in a
harshly repressive state, Chief Justice Lamer solidifies the doctrinal barriers
to using section 7 more broadly to secure a constitutional foundation for
public responsibility for benefit provision."7 6 This is the first sign that
G. (J.)'s seemingly remarkable conclusion that there is a free-standing
entitlement under section 7 to publicly funded legal aid may be more
illusory than real.
The emergence of the classical language of liberty in this context
also evokes a strong and recurrent ideological theme in the state ordering
of child welfare. Chief Justice Lamer's respect for G.(J.)'s sovereignty as an
autonomous individual both challenges and affirms the ideology of classical
liberalism and its subtext on the traditional family that has underpinned the
approach to child welfare in Canada since the first statute. Importantly,
respect for G.(J.)'s liberty disrupts the heavily gendered trope of traditional
and historical constructions of parental rights in terms of the "empire of the
father." As noted earlier, the first child welfare statutes redrew the line
between public supervision and the private authority of parents while at the
same time enforcing a specific notion of family relations in terms of
paternal authority over naturally subordinate children and over the
caregiving work of wives and mothers. The sight of G.(J.) "cross dressing"
in the classical liberal language of respect for parental/paternal authority
represents a liberating and transgressive moment in legal discourse.
However, recall that the reconfiguration of public and private responsibility
in these first statutes took the form of state enforcement "of needed care
through the medium of the family" rather than state support for the labour
175 G.(J.), supra note 2 at 77-78.
176 W.A. Schabas comments that "most judges remain very conservative on this issue" of whether
social and economic rights inhere in section 7 of the Charter. "Freedom from Want: How Can We Make
Indivisibility More Than a Mere Slogan?" (2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 189 at 207.
[VOL. 39, No. 4
Child Welfare Law and State Restnicturing
of caring.' In doing so, these early legal regimes operated to instill in
marginalized families a notion of family relations that was not only
gendered but also shaped by the experiences of white middle-class urban
Canadians. Thus, although the majority decision in G. (J.) rejects, at least
on a formal level, the gendered dimension of the "empire" trope, the
construction of parental rights in terms ofnegativeprivacy and reputational
interests leaves intact its class and, to some extent, its racial and cultural
subtext.
In contrast, Justice L'Heureux-Dub 's concurring reasons
demonstrate that it is possible to read section 7 in a way that aclmowledges
the particularities and materialities of barriers to enjoying the personhood
signified by section 7. Justice L'Heureux-Dube insists on a reading of
section 7 that is informed by and consistent with Charter principles of
substantive equality,17 3 directly linking child welfare to the feminization of
poverty and to issues that concern "members of other disadvantaged and
vulnerable groups, particularly visible minorities, Aboriginal people, and
the disabled."'79 She refuses to subsume crucial aspects of G.(J.)'s
situation-her status as a single mother and her indigence-to an abstract
narrative about sovereign individuals, reputational privacy, and negative
liberty.' It is possible to view the differences between the two judgements
not simply as two different readings of section 7 but also as tw%,'o different
accounts of the political character of child welfare law. Chief Justice
Lamer's judgement presents as inevitable the residual model of child
welfare law with its starldy drawn state intervention schematic and its
naturalization of the privatized character of child rearing work. Justice
L'Heureux-Dub&'sjudgement centres the social and political impacts of the
residual model and problematizes gendered assumptions about private and
public responsibility for children's well-being.'
177,Contradictions,, supra note 23 at 23S.
173 G.(J.), supra note 2 at 99.
179 Ibi at 100.
1 O IbMd. at 99.
181Somewhat the same split regarding the nature of the protected parental interest occurs in
WInipeg Child andFamiy Sevices v. KL.W, supra note 3, only here the characterization of theinterest
in terms of privacy and reputational interests is invoked by Justice Arbour in diszent. thb, at 532-33.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 adheres to her more socially textured account in a majority set of reaons.
IbU., at 562-64. Interestingly, both judges attempt to grapple with the current context of shifting
legislative approaches and vdespread social concern about the failure of chtld protection regimes to
adequately protect children. For Justice Arbour, dissenting in 1, Innip,-,:, %L. IV, &., the shift back
to a law enforcement model accentuates the need to rigorously protect a sphere of negative freedom
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However, even Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's articulation of the
substantive equality dimension of G.(J.)'s claim functions only to give a
more textured account of G.(J.)'s liberty and security concerns without
actually challenging the current alignment of public and private
responsibility for children's welfare by entitling her to material support.
Thus, although on a formal level, equal liberty is accorded to both mothers
and fathers, the anchoring of both Chief Justice Lamer and Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6's accounts in the private/public vision of the liberal
political order not only reinscribes the class and racial dimensions of the
ordering of childrearing work but its gendered dimension as well. The
specific nature of the substantive and material costs to G.(J.) and to other
women in her situation are laid out in the wider record of G.(J.)'s legal
struggles. Not only did G.(J.) fail to win back custody of her children, even
with the help ofpro bono legal representation,'82 but also the terms of her
defeat appear to entrench what one commentator, Julia Krane, has
described as a regime of enforced mother protection. 83
Both Karen Swift and Julia Krane have written of the ways in which
child welfare practice, particularly in recent years, is directed increasingly
at providing "various kinds of treatment programs aimed at the
rehabilitation of inadequate mothers" rather than at support.t" Indeed, the
tension between correction and support inevitably shifts in the direction of
correction as neo-liberal values and strategies become the norm. Krane's
analysis is developed in the context of a study of state responses to sexual
and physical abuse, an area in which one would expect mobilization of the
fullest range of services. Krane postulates that under contemporary regimes
informed by the principle of the "least disruptive alternative"
[p]rotection ... is a process that entails translation of the problem of child sexual abuse to one
of failure to protect. Rewritten in this way, the problem is transformed from an offence
against "over-intervention." Ibid. at 535-37. For Justice L'Heureux-Dub, writing the majority reasons,
the resort to warrantless apprehensions in non-emergency situations must be viewed against the
backdrop of increased awareness regarding the vulnerability of children to abuse within familics. Ibid.
at 563-64.
182 G. (.),supra note 2 at 59. G.(J.), however, did ultimately regain custody of her children on the
expiry of the second temporary order. Ibid. at 59.
183 J. Krane, "Least Disruptive and Intrusive Course of Action ... for Whom? Insights from
Feminist Analysis of Practice in Cases of Child Sexual Abuse" in J. Pulkingham & G. Tcrnowetsky, eds.
(Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997).
184"Contradictions," supra note 23 at 245. See also, ibid. at 58-74.
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committed predominantly by men to transgressions or acts of ommion by vomcn as wives,
mothers and protectors." I"
Social workers, Krane argues, applying the dominant family
dynamics model of sexual abuse, analyse child sexual abuse in terms of
family dysfunction in which the failure of women to act effectively as
protectors of their children from abusive male family members is the
defining feature shaping state intervention. Krane's study of case worker
notes revealed that mothers are typically presumed to have the knowledge
and ability to recognize indicators of abuse in their children's behaviour as
well as the power to intervene and protect their children from abuse.'c
Mothers are systematically urged to take on the ostensibly public mandate
of protection by pledging to observe and report warning signs in the
offender's behaviour and to provide or arrange for comprehensive
supervision and shepherding of the victimized children.'" Male non-
offenders, most notably fathers, are rarely held to the same expectation.
Despite the fact that most mothers, even those with small children, work
outside the home, the expectation of "mother protection" presumes the
workplace engagement of mothers to be secondary." In addition, in cases
in which the offender is the father, mothers are asked often to choose
between having their children apprehended or separating from offenders
who are a significant source of support for the family. Krane describes the
consequences of this "voluntary" choice for the mothers involved as follows:
Some moved into public housing, others sought welfare. Some had to contend with finding
accommodation, paying first and last month's rent, packing belongings and phyically
relocating while working full-time or caring for their children. Throughout this p.-riod they
also had to attend support groups to deal vith the abuse, arrange for their children to attend
group meetings and appear in court.194
The women in I'rane's study present catalogues of the small but
cumulatively significant changes to their daily routines involved in carrying
the responsibility-described by one woman as a "ball and chain"--of
185 Krane, Ibid. at 62.
186 Ibid. at 64. Krane points out that this theme persists in case worker obsr ations even though
the literature indicates a wide variation in mothers' awareness of and reactions to abuse and, as well,
a pattern in child sesual abuse "wherein the offender sets up the conditions for acceds, opportunity and
privacy, induces or engages the child and imposes secrecy." bL
187 Ib at 65-66.
1SS bida at 71.
189 Ibid at 67.
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watching, observing, shepherding and protecting.""9 Although G.(J.)'s
situation involves issues of neglect rather than abuse, the same dynamic of
directing services to rehabilitate mothers and instill appropriate mothering
practices rather than to support mothering work is evident in the
characterization of G.(J.) relied upon by the lower courts in denying her
challenge to the state's removal of her two children. The portrait of G.(J.)
that emerges from these judgments is of a woman whose life is beset with
crises and instability. The judicial record notes that she has moved several
times, had several partners, and placed her children in and out of care.'
Particularly crucial to the continued removal of her children from her
custody, however, is a psychologist's assessment that "... [s]he takes no
sense of personal responsibility for having mismanaged any of the child-
raising situations."'" Indeed, it is repeatedly observed that she tends to
attribute her troubles to others rather than herself. Her overestimation of
her own capacities is described as bordering on a "clinical elevation in a
scale entitled Grandiosity." 93 One witness provides a pointed and poignant
example of this behaviour, to the effect that:
While J. has been willing to receive helpers sent by the Department to assist with her
household, her interpretation of their duties was quite removed from their actual purpose.
She insisted that "No one has said that there is anything wrong with my parenting skills," and
perceived helpers to be there to look after the children, or possibly do a bit of housework.""
Thus, G.(J.), when presented with corrective and instructional
services, demanded and expected support. The disjunction between G.(J.)'s
idea of the purpose of social worker intervention and the actual regime
governing intervention encapsulates the slippage between the two
contradictory meanings of liberal respect for families, namely family
support and family privacy. The slippage for G.(J.) is not simply a point of
argument. It has devastating personal consequences, resulting almost
inevitably in an assessment that attributes many of the negative aspects of
her situation to her uncooperative personality. G.(J.) is also faulted for
protesting about the meagreness of her weekly access to her children but
then, during her access visits, grocery shopping while leaving her children
1 90 Ibid. at 68.
191 New Brunswick v. J.G., [1995] N.B.J. No. 3 (Q.B.) at para. 4, online (QL)(NBJ).
192 Ibid at para. 6 quoting psychologist Barbara Gibson.
Ibid. at paras. 6,8.
194 Ibid. at para. 8.
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in the care of a babysitter.195 Indeed, she is faulted for complaining about
everyone and everything-about the counsellors sent to help her, the
individuals sent to transport her Idds, and the school officials and parent
helpers. It is inappropriate to second-guess judicial assessments of fitness
to parent but the general features of the record illustrate both Swit's and
Krane's point that services are increasingly directed at rehabilitating and
disciplining "mother-protectors" rather than supporting mothering work
performed by women who, like G.(J.), are coping with economic and social
disadvantage. In the end, G.(J.)'s irritating resistance and rejection of the
rehabilitative regime seems to figure as importantly in the judicial denial of
custody as her instability and the distress experienced by her children. Her
most serious transgressions are aimed at resisting the enforcement of
privatized responsibility for child rearing and at demanding support for and
relief from her work rather than training in how to perform it more
effectively. 6 She is inevitably found inadequate within a model that fails
to comprehend that grocery shopping in a lone-mother household is an
unavoidable and necessary component of parenting. Chief Justice Lamer's
vindication of her rights to be left alone in the exercise of her parental
sovereignty signifies liberal respect and dignity but in a cruelly ironic
manner, given the material and structural features of her situation. At some
point, G.(J.)'s delusions of grandiosity that fuel her stubborn resistance
have to be weighed alongside judicial delusions of a mythic motherhood
miraculously unaffected by poverty and systemically ordered inequalities.
In sum, the resonances with classical liberal ideologyin the parental
rights analysis in G. (J) by themselves are not surprising, especially given
the Charter's liberal lineage. However, those resonances translate, in
material terms, in different ways in the differing contexts of a political order
that subscribes, at least in part, to social democratic ideals and one which,
increasingly, is committed to neo-liberal ideals. The glimpses of G.(J.)'s life,
caught in the records of her many appearances before the courts, reflect
back to us in painfully immediate terms the consequences of the
reconfiguration currently underway. The residual model of child welfare
associated with classical liberalism under which families bear primary
responsibility for the costs of social reproduction has remained in place
throughout Canadian history. However, its gendered, racial, and class
impacts were, to some extent, moderated by the prevailing social work
195 bE at para. 30.
196 In addition, she is faulted for encouraging her children to "reject socially accepted values,
institutions and persons in authority." Ibid. at para. 23 quoting psychologist Barbara Gibson.
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philosophy of family support and the more social democratic conception of
public responsibility for need within the political sphere during the mid-
century period. As discussed in the preceding part, in the current neo-
liberal context, the slippage from family support to family privacy on a
rhetorical level is reflected in structural and material terms in the slashing
of welfare budgets, the turn to targeted programs, and the move to
criminalize parental neglect and other behaviours rooted in socio-structural
dependency and need. Against this backdrop, the parental sovereignty
language in G. (J.) is not simply a predictable manifestation of the Charter's
liberal roots but a reflection and legitimation of larger political trends.
B. Fundamental Justice and Public Responsibility
The fundamental justice portion of the Supreme Court of Canada's
analysis-affirming G. (J.)'s entitlement to legal aid-appears as a striking
contrast, not only to the traditional account of rights in the parental rights
portion, but also to the growing judicial support for privatized models of
responsibility and for the privatizing strategies of current governments. A
second reading, however, again disrupts this optimism.
First, the majority reasons by Chief Justice Lamer frame the
entitlement to legal aid in deliberately restrictive terms. The triggering
interest-psychological integrity with respect to one's parental relationship
to one's children-is tied closely to concern about one's reputation as a
parent rather than to one's parental identity or commitment."9 The result
is an exceedingly narrow ambit of protection that does not extend to the
interference in parent-child relations stemming from imprisonment of a
child or even negligent killing of a child by a state official. 98 Second, the
Court does not mandate provision of legal aid in child apprehension
proceedings, only the preservation of judicial discretion to award legal aid
funding where circumstances warrant. 199 The discretion is structured by
consideration of three factors drawn from appellate cases on legal aid
entitlement in the penal context. 1. the complexity of the proceedings; 2.
the seriousness of the interest at stake; and 3. the capacity of the
applicant.xo
1 9 7 G. (J.), supra note 2 at 78-9.
19 8 IbM. at 79.
199 Ibi. at 93-4.
200 Ibid at 83.
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Again, the fuller record of G.(J.)'s legal struggles provides a glimpse
of how this recipe for fundamental justice might operate when transplanted
from the penal to the child apprehension context. In G.(J.)'s case,
presumably with an eye to the appellate jurisprudence, her counsel led as
evidence of G.(J.)'s incapacity to represent herself the very same
psychologist's report that had disqualified her as a fit parent in the child
apprehension proceedings.21 In other words, G.(J.) was inevitably
pressured into constructing herself as inadequate on the very terms which
guaranteed the loss of her custodial rights.
Finally, the decision in G.(J.) is an example of the procedural
dimension of justice trumping the substantive dimension. Judicial concerns
about the unfairness of the process by which G.(J.)s rights are infringed
displace any consideration of the unfairness of a private market in legal
services that is inherently exclusionary of socially and economically
marginalized individuals. Indeed, a key factor in Chief Justice Lamer's
conclusion that fundamental justice would have required the provision of
legal aid in G.(J.)'s case was the calculation of how little it would cost New
Brunsvick to extend its benefit provision in the discretionary and carefully
circumscribed manner set out in his reasons.3- Thus, in many respects,
Chief Justice Lamer's reasons are consistent with the judicial discourse of
privatization.
However, while the decision in G.(J.) both echoes and lends
legitimacy to larger political trends, I do not mean to suggest that a more
generous response by the Supreme Court majority would have addressed
the fundamental issue of collective responsibility for G.(J.)'s situation. So
far, I have endeavoured to show how the rhetoric of state intervention in
the sphere of political discourse, reinvigorated and partially revised by the
neo-liberal privatization agenda, can easily mislead. It dresses up neo-
liberal economic imperatives in the stirring language of individual human
freedom in order to justify a radically diminished notion of the public
sphere. In the context of child welfare regimes, the rhetoric of state
intervention obscures the slippage between the family privacy and family
201 New Brunswick (Minister of Hcalth and Social Sen'ices) v.J.G.. [19971 N.BJ. No. 133 (C.A ) at
paras. SO-SI, online: QL (NBJ) per Justice Bastarache's dissenting reasons At the Supreme Court,
Justice L'Heureu.-Dub6, in her concurring reasons, accepted the majority's analytic frame ork but
tried to moderate its impact by directing that claimants for legal aid need only invoke the systemic
dimension of personal attributes to demonstrate a lack of capacity. G.1.) v. New Bnnsirk, s.tnpra note
2 at 105-06. It remains to be seen whether this is feasible, gwen strategic pressures and the difficulty
of disentangling systemic and personal factors when mating an argument about piarsonal cap2acity
2 02 Ibd at 92.
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support interpretations of liberal autonomy and respect. However, my aim
is not to simply transpose this thesis to the sphere of judicial discourse
under the Charter. G. (J.), with its majority and minority reasons neatly
mapping over fundamentally different visions of the liberal political order,
also illuminates the ideological and institutional limits of rights discourse
and strategic litigation. In short, even a judge such as Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6 who is willing to expansively interpret the liberal legal frame of the
Charter and of the courts' role under the Constitution, must ultimately work
within the prevailing alignment of public and private responsibility as it has
been drawn in the sphere of democratic deliberation. Legislative majorities
working within the liberal democratic frame can significantly alter the
meaning of state intervention and, in turn, of collective public responsibility
for welfare; judicial majorities working within the bounds of the Charter
face institutional constraints that-as critical scholars have often pointed
out-are directly rooted in and thus more rigidly enforce the central
features of the classical liberal story. 3
The contextualization of G.(J.)'s claim exposes the structural
underpinnings of the finding of parental neglect that led to the
apprehension and removal of her children. However, within the case itself
those details are not themselves challengeable. They fail to fit into the
classical account of state intervention that structures Charter litigation.
They do not constitute state actions that intrude upon G.(J.)'s parental
sovereignty, given the actual mapping of the boundary of state
responsibility by the New Brunswick legislature. Instead, at best, the
contextualization of G. (J.)'s claim functions only to strengthen her
entitlement to material support for legal costs in order to ensure that her
children are removed in a procedurally fair manner. No doubt the Court
could have been much more supportive in its delineation of G. (J.)'s
entitlement to legal aid. As it was, the Court, despite the structural and
ideological constraints on its powers, was arguably more generous than
political decisionmakers operating outside the judicial realm. It is the latter,
not judges, who are responsible for addressing the systemic dimension of
the stresses faced by G.(J.) and others in her situation and for articulating
the public and private meanings of their claims to liberal citizenship.
Indeed, the bleakness of the neo-liberal account of those claims currently
being offered in some Canadian legislatures provides a flattering backdrop
203 See, for example, J. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't
Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 307.
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for the courts. It gives judicial caution the flare of courage and the warmth
of heartfelt sympathy.
V. CONCLUSION
G. (J.) provides the heroic narratives of one woman's victorious
defiance and of the liberal dream that individual rights are the keystone of
social justice and individual freedom. However, a closer reading of the case
shows how these narratives intertwine with and echo-not always in
positive ways-the tension between liberalism's fundamental commitment
to a privatized model of responsibility for individual need and the systemic
nature of need. The tension shapes the historical development of child
welfare in Canada, and throughout this history, is intertwined inextricably
with the theme of the gendered nature of our political order and of our
concepts of citizenship. Whether one considers the abstract citizen of
classical liberalism, the worker citizen of social democraticliberalism, or the
taxpayer citizen of neo-liberalism, the recurrent construction of familial
practices and relationships as essentially private and inhering in the sphere
of natural preferences or individual choice belies any change in the
experience of citizenship for many women, particularly those disadvantaged
by poverty and by intersecting and substantive inequalities. Privatization of
responsibility for the well-being of children ensures that the work of
nurturing children performed mostly by women in families or in low-waged
and often racialized sectors of the worlforce remains invisible in judicial
calculations of fundamental justice and the best interests of the child.P
More embodied notions of justice characteristic of the social democratic
vision of the liberal order can moderate and soften the impact of residual
models of welfare. However, as neo-liberal values and instrumental
imperatives capture political momentum and mainstream support, the
Charter language of section 7 parental rights is likely to reinforce rather
than challenge the assumption that the moral and psychological failings of
mothers in G.(J.)'s situation have primary, if not exclusive, relevance in any
consideration of their children's distress and neglect. Nevertheless, it vould
be unfortunate not to recognize G.(J.)'s achievement. Her tenacity in
pursuing her claim through multiple and often parallel legal proceedings
and in persisting until the final decision by the Supreme Court of Canada,
despite a dismal record of defeats at lower levels, is inspiring. She is indeed
204 With regard to paid domesticwork, see A. BaIan & D.K. Stasiulis, eds, vot OneoftdeFam4a:
Foreign Domestic orokers in Canada (Toronto: Univcrsity of Toronto Press, 1997),
2001]
770 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 39, NO. 4
an iconic figure. She represents the ambivalent character of strategic
litigation under the Charter and the double-edged nature of the political
vocabulary of individual rights. More fundamentally, she represents the
challenge to rethink our political order with herself at the centre rather
than the margins.
